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Abstract
In this paper we consider the case for assigning tax revenues to Scotland, by
which we mean that taxes levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the
Scottish budget. The budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by
transfers from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current
situation whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from West-
minster. Our suggestion falls short of full fiscal federalism for Scotland . meaning
that Scotland had control over choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal trans-
fers from Westminster would be minimal. We use propositions drawn from the
theory of fiscal federalism to argue for a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes
retained in Scotland and public spending in Scotland. A closer matching of spend-
ing with taxes would better signal to beneficiaries the true costs of public spending
in terms of taxes raised. It would also create more complete incentives for politi-
cians to provide public goods and services in quantities and at qualities that voters
are actually willing to pay for. Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal
tax cost of spending does not enter into political agents. calculations as spend-
ing is out of a fixed total budget. Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered in
signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total
budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster.
At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in
sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen
horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions. Horizontal bal-
ance occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of
public goods and services at the same per capita tax cost. The complete removal
of the bloc grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that
currently promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax rev-
enues creates other problems with full fiscal federalism. Taxes derived from North
Sea oil would constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known
to be volatile in the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange
rate. At the present time variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster.
Scotland is insulated through the bloc grant. This risk sharing mechanism would
be lost with full fiscal federalism. It is true that Scotland could turn to financial
markets to tide itself over oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and
less diversified financial entity than the UK as a whole it would probably have
to borrow on less favorable terms than can Westminster. Scotland would have to
bear this extra cost itself. Also, with full fiscal federalism it is difficult to see how
the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer. At present, tax
revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are absorbed
2
through an increase in vertical imbalance. This acts as an automatic stabilizer for
the Scottish economy. No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal federal-
ism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms -
as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E62, H1, H61, H7, H87
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There is currently an active debate in the UK about regional funding. It would seem
that both internal (from within Scotland) and external (from other regions and,
perhaps, Her Majesty’s Treasury) pressures will be brought to bear to move to a
system which is seen as more equitable and puts all regions of the UK on an equal
footing. It therefore seems a most timely moment to consider what alternatives exist
to replace the current funding model. In this paper we make the economic case for
fiscal federalism in Scotland. It is worth stressing that we do not set out to prove the
fiscal federalist case, rather our point is that the fiscal federalist case provides a better
balance than the alternatives of the status quo or that of full fiscal autonomy. Our
objective in this pamphlet can be neatly summarized using the following quote from
the leading textbook on public finance:
"Our task…is to extend the economic principle of efficient resource use to the
public sector. Some believe this to be a hopeless task and hold that the
determination of budget policy is a matter of politics only, not amenable to
economic analysis, a view that is unduly pessimistic. Budget policy has a
difficult task and will hardly realize a perfect solution. But not all feasible
policies are equally good. Efficiency of resource use, here as in the private
sector, is a matter of degree, and economic analysis can help us in seeking the
best answer. The task is to design a mechanism for the provision of social
goods which operating in a democratic setting will be as efficient as feasible."
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989, page 41)
                                                
1 The authors are grateful to Wendy Alexander, Jo Armstrong, Brian Ashcroft, Tam Bayoumi, Diane
Coyle, Dhammika Dhamapala, David Heald,John McLaren and Arthur Midwinter for their very helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies: we are responsible for any
remaining errors of omission or commission and for the views expressed in the paper.
4Our main recommendation is that a fiscal federalist solution for Scotland
should involve the assignment and partial devolution of tax revenues.  This means that
a considerable proportion of taxes raised in Scotland would be directly returned to
Scotland. The key taxes included in the assignment would be income tax, VAT and
corporation tax, with income tax and a package of other taxes being devolved. We
argue for this on the basis of the economic theory of fiscal federalism.2  The argument
that impresses us the most is that tax assignment would help better to align decision-
making by the Scottish Executive and Parliament with the preferences of the Scottish
electorate. There are, at least, two reasons for this. First, the voice of Scottish
politicians is louder in Edinburgh compared to Westminster, and, second, Scottish
politicians based in Edinburgh have to think more carefully about the tax cost to their
local electorate.
We look at it this way, the present bloc grant system leaves Edinburgh the
choice, within any administrative constraints set by Westminster, of how to spend the
grant across the spectrum of public goods supplied by government.  The whole of the
grant is spent as there is little or no obvious benefit to Scotland of returning an
unspent portion to Westminster. This system gives the Scottish Executive and
Parliament little incentive to choose the right balance – as they would if they had to
think about it, between the supply of private goods and the supply of public goods in
Scotland. That is, to get the relative size of the private sector in Scotland right. This is
surely a matter of importance.  Some in Scotland argue that the public sector is too
large and stultifies private enterprise.  Others would argue for a larger public sector.
However, the present public sector funding system in Scotland largely makes this
                                                
2 The UK is usually defined as a ‘unitary’ rather than a ‘federal’ state. However, it is often recognised
that almost any degree of fiscal devolution in a unitary state creates some federal characteristics.
5important debate moot. What would be the point of having such a debate when
Westminster under the rigid Barnett formula largely sets Scottish public spending?
In terms of taxes raised by assignment, we propose what we refer to as a
balanced tax assignment. The idea here is that taxes raised by assignment should as
far as possible be sufficient to match identifiable expenditure in Scotland. This is
important since we believe that economically rational decisions are most likely to be
adopted when decision-makers have to balance the benefits of particular spending
decisions with the costs of these decisions. Indeed, such rational decision making is
most likely to occur at the margin and in order to give politicians the incentive to
make appropriate decisions at the margin we propose a marginal tax rule: for any
given fiscal settlement for Scotland, the ability to increase expenditure in one
particular area has to be paid for either by a reduction in spending in another category
or an increase in taxes. How quickly and to what extent economic rationality
penetrates decision-making by the polity is, perhaps, debatable. However, it is a basic
tenet of economics, indeed, of social science in general, that rational decision-makers
will sooner or later come to compare costs with benefits - and the sooner the better!
Under the present bloc grant system there is little connection between
spending decisions taken by the Scottish Executive and Parliament and decisions on
how and from whom to raise the necessary revenues. Pressure for more government
spending in Scotland can always blame Westminster and the Barnett formula for
squeezing Scottish public funds.  Thinking about government spending in Scotland
would change dramatically if the Scottish polity had also to consider the revenue side
of its political calculus. We argue that the main problem with financing public
spending by Edinburgh - governed as it is by the Barnett formula, is that it is almost
entirely concerned with equity – or horizontal balance – in the UK, to the detriment of
6efficiency.  Nor is it achieving its declared objective of equalizing Scottish per capita
public spending with the rest of the UK; and there is concern in Scottish political
circles that funds from other sources, such as Objective One money from the
European Union, are the net additions to the Scottish budget as they are intended to
be.
Introducing a harder budget constraint than exists at present could have
beneficial advantages for Scotland.  First, and most simply, improved alignment of
decision-making by the executive with the preferences of the electorate should
improve the use of financial resources – this represents a static improvement in
efficiency. Second, Edinburgh does not at present have strong incentives to use tax
revenues to raise economic growth in Scotland because increased tax revenue from a
faster-growing tax base would be paid to Westminster and not re-channelled back to
Edinburgh – an improved growth performance would represent a dynamic
improvement in efficiency. The present incentives for greater efficiency in public
spending – that is, cutting the costs and raising the productivity of public services
such as health and education – are also probably deficient (although, of course, there
are other ways in which public sector efficiency could be improved – see Crafts,
2004).3 While it is true that under the bloc grant, cost saving in one area of public
spending can be used for greater spending in another, it is broadly true that cost
savings will not show up as lower taxes.  There is of course the ‘tartan tax’ that could
indeed be cut to reflect lower expenditure needs, but the amount of variability is not
great.  This is why we propose greater variability in the tartan tax, increasing it from
plus/minus 3 percent to, say, plus/minus 7 percent, or, even doing away entirely with
any bounds limitations.
                                                
3 See The Economist, 9 April, 2004, for a recent discussion of this issue.
7We emphasise that in moving to a system of tax assignment that a trade-off is
involved between efficiency and equity.  The last paragraph summarises some
potential ways in which efficiency could be improved by assigning taxes raised in
Scotland to Scotland. However, what of equity in the UK as a whole – that is,
similarly situated individuals in the UK receiving similar publicly financed benefits?
We assume that – and provide economic arguments in favour of, the current
constitutional settlement – Scotland as a member of the UK, in which case equity
considerations in public spending in Scotland vis a vis the rest of the UK remain
relevant. It is true that public spending per head in Scotland is greater than in most
other parts of the UK – we believe in part because of greater Scottish needs.  But with
tax assignment, fiscal transfers from Westminster may decline.  This though is not
certain as fiscal transfers to meet greater Scottish needs for public spending would
have to be negotiated in any construction of fiscal federalism in the UK.  However,
the potential decline in revenue for Scotland is at the heart of the trade-off that exists
in the move to a fiscal federal solution and is the one we emphasise in this paper. The
potential advantage of a fiscal federal system is that even if transfers did decline in the
short-run Scotland could still be better off in the longer term. A fiscal system that
promotes economic growth will potentially deliver greater tax revenues – which
would not have to be handed over to Westminster, and could be used to support
higher levels of public spending and/or lower taxes in Scotland in the long run.
Economic theory, with empirical support, has suggested a further possible
advantage of fiscal federalism in terms of the creation of cohesive social capital.  The
argument runs that when a people have greater responsibility for their own welfare
they will indeed become more responsible. Of course, achieving the potential
advantages of fiscal federalism depends on the correct institutional structure being in
8place. If it is not, and if the Scottish polity turn out persistently to make sub-optimal
decisions, the result of increased fiscal decentralisation could be detrimental to
Scotland in both the short- and long-run. But we think that we are suggesting a
financial structure that is most likely to induce something on the lines of economically
sensible decision-making – at least ‘eventually’.
We emphasise that our fiscal federalist proposal in a sense lies between the
current bloc grant status quo and what we refer to as the “straw man autonomy
position” of full fiscal federalism whereby Scottish public spending would be
supported only by Scottish-sourced taxes.  The greatest disadvantage of ‘full fiscal
federalism’ is that it gives up on the matter of social equity within the UK. In other
words there would no longer be common social security benefits and pensions within
the UK, nor an objective of attempted per capital public spending equalization as
under Barnett.
It would also leave Scotland vulnerable to adverse economic shocks because
macroeconomic stabilization would be harder to achieve without the automatic
stabilizer of cyclically sensitive net transfers from Westminster. At present net
transfers increase when Scottish-sourced revenues decline (as, for example, with a
decline in oil taxes) relative to those in the UK as a whole.
Our balanced tax assignment proposal has risks for Scotland because public
finance revenues would not be as cushioned as they are under the present system.
However, variability in revenues may be cushioned through a variety of public sector
borrowing mechanisms that we discuss. Besides, cushioning under full fiscal
autonomy would be a good deal less than with our balanced tax assignment. As to the
status quo, that has risks too.  In particular, it does little to promote either static or
dynamic economic efficiency, so leaving Scotland the poorer for it.
9In embarking on a fiscal federalist system a needs assessment exercise would
have to be conducted in order to tie down the size of any bloc grant provided by the
centre. We also argue for some form of transition mechanism that minimises the
amount of disruption in the system and maintains the level of revenue initially
available to the Scottish Parliament at a time of significant change. We are also of the
opinion that any legislation creating tax assignment for Scotland should allow scope
for further modification of the Scottish fiscal system – much as on the lines of the
Spanish system where regional finances under the law are reviewed every five years.
For one thing fiscal federalism is currently evolving worldwide, and in several
countries is being allowed to pass through several phases. For another thing, it is very
hard to get it absolutely right first time – something that we believe the Scotland Act
(1998) failed to achieve.
To flesh out the tax assignment idea a little bit, our thinking is that a good tax
system for Scotland would be one that stimulates efficiency in public spending which,
in turn, will improve social cohesion and economic growth in Scotland and the UK as
a whole. This would be achieved by a system that:
• assigns a portion of an agreed range of tax revenues to Scotland – such as
taxes on personal income, corporations and expenditures:
• allows partial devolution of income tax;
• devolves in entirety a further range of taxes such as stamp duties, betting
and gaming duties and vehicle excise duties.
This system would also keep a meaningful equalization grant to provide for equity
considerations, something that is in line with standard practice in the rest of the
European Union and much of the rest of the world.
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We argue that there is little scope for wholesale devolution of the main taxes –
personal income tax, corporation tax and VAT, both because differences in tax rates
or definitions of tax bases, especially if they became large, would introduce tax
distortions within the UK. This would be especially so given that contiguous English
regions have no political institutions through which beneficially to adjust to changing
tax conditions in Scotland. Moreover, changes in the rate of a ‘Scottish VAT’, if it
were possible, would run against the grain of expenditure tax equalization in the EU
as a whole. However, despite this we argue that some form of limited tax devolution
is important, especially for expenditure decisions made at the margin, and to address
this we propose what we refer to as the marginal tax rule.
Aside from the devolution of taxes, however, even the assignment of tax
revenues to Scotland - without Scottish control over either tax rates or bases, could
substantially help in raising efficiency by aligning public spending and taxing by the
Scottish Executive and Parliament.  That the amount of tax revenues coming to
Scotland would in part depend on the health of the Scottish economy should create an
incentive to politicians to be growth friendly in their public spending decisions.
Devolved taxes would have a similar, perhaps even stronger, effect.
But let us not be naïve: the beneficial effects of tax assignment that we
emphasise depend on the response of Scottish politicians and electorate to the new
incentive structures. If they think that they are getting a free lunch – freed from the
bloc grant they can have an enhanced tax-and-spend regime, they will be sadly
disillusioned. The benefits of greater efficiency in public spending and faster
economic growth will come only if the Scottish polity comes to realize that their
budget constraint has been toughened, not relaxed.  If it acts on the latter assumption
public spending will not become more efficient, the tax burden in Scotland will grow,
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Scottish economic growth will not improve, and Scottish public sector indebtedness
will most probably grow - perhaps unsustainably so. Our idea of tax assignment and
partial tax devolution will ultimately benefit the Scottish standard of living only if it is
accepted that greater tax responsibility introduces a harder budget constraint into the
public spending decisions. As it happens, evidence from other countries supports the
idea that transferring fiscal responsibility downwards from central government does
indeed promote economic welfare.
We realize that the design of a fiscal federalist structure for Scotland depends
to some extent upon the development of fiscal federalism in the rest of the UK.  At the
political level, at least to us, it does not seem to be viable for Westminster to develop
fiscal federalism for the English regions, assigning or devolving some tax powers to,
say, London, without also doing so for Scotland.  Also, what is economically rational
to assign or devolve to Scotland, depends in part on what one day might be passed
down from Westminster to the English regions, especially the North of England. For
example, we could possibly support devolution of corporation tax rates to Edinburgh
(as in Canada’s regions), if a North of England ‘regional authority’ had similar
powers. It might then be possible for the adjacent regions to reach an equilibrium in
corporation tax rates – again much as in Canada today, something that would not be
possible without the development of fiscal federalism in England.  This, again, is why
we argue for the introduction of rolling five year reviews of fiscal federalism in
Scotland and, for that matter, in the UK as a whole.
Outline of the pamphlet
In the Introduction we make a case for using economics to argue for changes in the
financing of public spending by the Scottish Executive and Parliament. Our main
12
argument is that the current large gap between spending and taxes raised through
Edinburgh – something known as “vertical imbalance” - is inefficient because it does
not provide sufficient incentives for Edinburgh to make the most efficient use of its
public finances.
In Part I we flesh out the economic theory of fiscal federalism that supports
the case for greater vertical balance between Scottish public spending and the
financing of this spending. The thrust of this body of theory – which comes in two
flavours, ‘traditional’ and ‘new’, is that decision-makers (the Scottish electorate and
its agents the Scottish Executive and Parliament) will make more efficient decisions
concerning the use of public money if they have to face the full opportunity costs
involved. This means that public spending by Edinburgh needs to be more closely
aligned with taxes raised in Scotland, and less reliant on a bloc grant from
Westminster. If so, the true tax burden of public spending will become more apparent,
and decision-making should be better informed.
In Part I we also consider the benefits that Scottish trade and employment gain
from Scotland being a part of the UK monetary union – sharing a single currency with
the rest of the UK. We also discuss the implications for decentralised fiscal policy in
Scotland that follows from continuing to use the pound-sterling as its currency. In
particular, we argue that while most macroeconomic stabilisation for the UK can be
performed as it is now through Westminster, there may be some room for the Scottish
budget being used to share this burden. Indeed, as we point out in a later section,
several countries use internal stability pacts between their regions and central
government as a matter of ‘macroeconomic risk sharing’ – using borrowing by
regional governments to help stabilise the national economy.
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Part I also contains an overview of the recent literature on social capital and
fiscal federalism. The key argument is that decentralised fiscal policy, by bringing
government closer to the people, can be a key element in strengthening social capital.
To quote one specialist in this field, social capital is ‘the trust, norms and social
networks that foster mutually beneficial cooperation in society’. The basic idea is if
more fiscal responsibility is given to a people the more economically and socially
responsible they will become. The benefits of this are many, and we emphasise that
there will be a tendency for efficiency in public policy to increase.  In turn, this will
improve economic growth and welfare in the long term.  Supporting evidence for this
is reported.
In Part II we consider the features of devolved fiscal policy in ten other
countries besides the UK. The main point is that the UK stands out as the country with
the least devolution of powers over regional taxation – that is, the UK has the most
extreme degree of vertical imbalance. We think that the UK has a lot to learn from
these other countries, and that it should join in with the international learning process
that is now going on between countries.
In Part III we first consider the present fiscal arrangements in Scotland and
then sketch out how fiscal federalism might look in Scotland based on the various
economic criteria discussed in this paper.  We argue for the introduction of a system
of tax assignment - that Scotland retains a portion of the taxes raised in the country –
and limited devolution of taxes.  This is different from the current system where taxes
raised in Scotland go into the consolidated fund and Westminster in effect decides
what will be the level of public spending in Scotland. We argue for tax assignment
and devolution because it brings home to the Scottish electorate and politicians the
true tax burden of Scottish public spending, and in this way should raise efficiency in
14
the use of public money.  The devolution of taxes is also important because it forces
decision-makers carefully to consider spending decisions at the margin – our marginal
tax rule.
We also make a case against ‘full’ fiscal federalism in Scotland – meaning
Scotland retains all of the taxes raised in Scotland and uses only these taxes to finance
public spending by the Scottish Parliament.  We have three main arguments against
full fiscal federalism. First, there are theoretical, constitutional and practical reasons
why all taxes should not be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Secondly, with the
Westminster budget cut out of providing direct macroeconomic stabilisation for
Scotland – something that it largely does now - the Scottish economy may well
become more volatile.  Thirdly, without fiscal transfers in the UK, it will be more
difficult, if not impossible, to promote equity – that is, fairness in the distribution of
public goods and services, in the Union.  Also there is likely to be a loss of the
economies of scale in the provision of social security if it were to be partitioned on a
regional basis. These kinds of difficulties in implementing full fiscal federalism are
presumably why we do not observe it in practice in any other nation state. In
particular, regions or states within a unitary or federal system have mutual obligations
which are essentially the price of access to shared services. A concluding section
further summarises the main findings of the paper.
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THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR FISCAL FEDERALISM IN SCOTLAND
Ronald MacDonald and Paul Hallwood
University of Strathclyde, UK, and University of Connecticut, USA
Introduction
Since the establishment of a Scottish parliament in 1999, there has been considerable
debate regarding the issue of fiscal federalism for Scotland. This debate, prominent in
the Scottish media, is usually along political lines. The case for fiscal federalism is
often argued to be synonymous with full political independence for Scotland, while
the argument against fiscal federalism is generally cast as inconsistent with the
political union of the UK. In this paper we try to move the debate about fiscal
federalism away from the highly contentious discussion that links fiscal federalism
with political independence towards an economic analysis of the case for fiscal
federalism.4 We take the existing constitutional settlement in the UK as given and
seek out arguments based on economic theory relating to the matter of greater
devolution of economic powers from Westminster to Edinburgh.5 Our objective is to
spark a debate on fiscal federalism which focuses on objective economic criteria
rather than emotional considerations.
The nub of the argument in this pamphlet is that for any devolved or federal
system to function effectively it must address the following key issues:
• How to assign expenditure responsibilities between the respective levels of
government;
                                                
4 Previous papers focussing on the economics of fiscal federalism for Scotland include Bell and
Christie (2002) and Darby, Muscatelli, and Roy (2002).
5 In particular, we use the ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ fiscal federalism literatures, the optimum currency
area literature, and draw on time consistency issues from the macroeconomic literature to make the
case for fiscal federalism in Scotland.
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• Define how those expenditures are financed in terms of tax and revenue
raising by the different levels of government;
• Specify the nature of intergovernmental transfers;
• Address the ability of sub-national governments to borrow.
The first of these issues was essentially settled with the establishment of the Scottish
Parliament and this represents a significant step towards fiscal federalism. However,
the other issues have not so far been properly addressed in a Scottish context and this
pamphlet addresses these issues in the light of experience to date.
At present the Executive has the power to change personal income taxes by
plus or minus three pence in the pound, the so-called tartan tax, and to set and raise
non-domestic rates - the proceeds of which accrue to local government - in addition to
setting a range of user charges such as the student tuition fees.  However, as has been
widely noted, the ultimate effect of this in terms of its revenue raising powers is likely
to be limited, as are its effect on incentives.
The phenomenon of central government having greater power to obtain
income than it actually needs for the exercise of its authority, while the sub-central
level has less power to raise income than it needs, is referred to in the fiscal
federalism literature as ‘vertical imbalance’ or ‘fiscal mismatch’. An imbalance
should be resolved if the sub-central level of government is able to exercise its
authority properly. One of the anomalies in the current UK system is that this vertical
imbalance has been partially resolved6 for the lowest tier of government – local
authorities - who can tax, spend and borrow, but not for the Scottish parliament.
However, an exclusive focus on vertical imbalances could result in ‘horizontal
imbalance’, in terms of transfers from the centre being inappropriate to deal with the
                                                
6 It has not been fully resolved since 80% of local government revenues are in the form of a direct grant
from the Scottish Parliament. Council tax, which is under control of the local authority only contributes
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principle of equalisation of resources based on needs at the regional or local level.
Needs equalisation exists in all systems. The question is the extent to which this
equalisation occurs. In all real world cases intergovernmental grants from central to
sub-central government range from a low of 22% in Canada to approximately to 80%
in Scotland. Some equalisation is inevitable to finance common services. This
equalisation mechanism may be directed to a specific service, such as health,
education or social security – or, as in the case of Scotland, the overall bloc grant.
In essence the challenge now facing Scotland is to find the most satisfactory
trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives. Achieving this will require
improving the vertical and horizontal balance on the revenue side. Scotland’s current
financing system is characterised by a high level of equalisation and a high level of
vertical imbalance. Hence the choice is: How much horizontal balance and, therefore,
needs equalization with the rest of the UK, is Scotland willing to give up in exchange
for more self-financing and so a reduction in vertical imbalance?
At the heart of the design of an appropriate fiscal system at the central or sub-
central level of government is finding an appropriate mix of the three key economic
roles of government, namely:
• the allocation, or, efficiency role;
• the equity, or, income equality function;
•  and the macroeconomic stabilisation role.
In designing a fiscal system there is inevitably a trade-off between these three
functions. As we shall see, in Scotland there is little scope for the devolution of a
macroeconomic stabilisation role for fiscal policy. Our analysis of trade-offs will
therefore focus mainly on allocative efficiency and equity considerations.
                                                                                                                                           
20 per cent of revenues and non domestic rate income is harmonised and pooled centrally and
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At the moment the allocation of additional revenues to Scotland is based on an
unconditional grant known as the Barnett formula (discussed in more detail below).
This formula is widely regarded as favouring Scotland since it delivers a higher per
capita level of revenue to Scotland than to most other regions of the UK (with the
exception of Northern Ireland). The argument that Scotland requires higher per capita
spending relative to the rest of the UK is based on the perceived greater needs in
Scotland due, for example, to its poorer health record and the sparsity of its
population.7 In essence the current arrangements for financing the Scottish Parliament
trades-off efficiency in favour of equity.
Moving to a fiscal federalist structure in Scotland would mean moving the
trade-off in the opposite direction: sacrificing some equity in favour of potentially
greater efficiency. This could produce fluctuations in income categories that would
not have occurred under the current system. However it could produce an improved
allocation of resources in the longer run and the opportunity potentially to incentivise
growth and ultimately generate additional revenues for spending functions. Two
points should be noted. First, superior allocative efficiency on the spending side, or on
the matching of costs and benefits across expenditure categories, is not inevitable, and
secondly, a reduction in horizontal balance is likely to reduce resources in the short
term. On the first of these points, increased efficiency depends largely on how
politicians react in the new revenue and tax environment; and they are more likely to
respond positively the greater is transparency and accountability in the system.
There are other arguments for fiscal federalism in Scotland which, although
related to the economic argument, are more to do with democratic, or political,
                                                                                                                                           
redistributed in the bloc grant.
7 The Barnett formula was first applied in 1978. In 1979 the Treasury conducted a needs assessment
exercise which generally favoured Scotland (and Northern Ireland) and despite the fact that Barnett was
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accountability. We note two such arguments. David Heald (1990) eloquently
expressed one aspect of the democratic accountability view:
‘Such an arrangement [a fiscal federalist arrangement] is essential for
the constitutional accountability of a Parliament which would possess
extensive legislative responsibilities and expenditure programmes. Moreover,
there would be much stronger incentives to fiscal responsibility under a
financial arrangement whereby a Scottish Executive must justify to a Scottish
Parliament, electors and taxpayers, its chosen trade-off between services and
taxes’.
The last sentence of this argument is similar in spirit to the economic case for
fiscal federalism that we make.
A second argument in this vein relates to the constitutional settlement in the
UK and, in particular, the possibility of a political party of one colour being in office
in Westminster and a different party in Edinburgh. Since under the current settlement,
funding for the Scottish parliament is essentially at the behest of the political party in
office at Westminster, a constitutional crises could arise if there was disagreement
between the two parties over the bloc grant allocation. To avoid such a potential
conflict the Edinburgh parliament should have appropriate tax and spending powers to
minimise the scope for unilateral rewriting of the financial dimensions of the
settlement.
We believe that these arguments are in themselves powerful ones in favour of
some form of fiscal federalist solution for Scotland. However, the main focus in this
pamphlet is the argument for fiscal federalism in terms of the economic trade-off
between equity and efficiency mentioned above.
                                                                                                                                           
supposed to act as a convergence formula (equalising per capita spending across the regions in the UK)
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Part I. The Theory of Fiscal Federalism
The ‘traditional’ case for fiscal federalism considers the provision of goods financed
by taxes at the regional level as well as the appropriate revenue collection system at
this level of government. In what follows we take the ‘regional’ level as the relevant
decentralised tier of government. We will sometimes use ‘sub-central government’
(SCG) for level(s) of government below that of ‘central government’ (CG). In this
part we consider the economic case for fiscal federalism. This comprises:
• How best to provide public goods and services at the regional or federal level;
• Hard and soft budget constraints and needs equalisation;
• The role of fiscal federalism in stimulating economic growth;
• The link between fiscal federalism and the monetary union in the UK.
 I.i The provision of public goods at the regional or federal level
Efficiency
The basic principle in the traditional theory of fiscal federalism is that SCG
should have the ability to provide goods and services that match the particular
preferences and circumstances of their constituents. The key presumption of fiscal
federalism is that the provision of public services should be located at the lowest level
of government encompassing geographically the relevant costs and benefits. In that
way efficiency and economic welfare can be increased above that generated by a more
uniform allocation mechanism.
This ‘benefit rule’ is standard theory in the field of public finance.  Rational
decisions are much more likely to be made when people in a ‘benefit region’ have to
face up to the costs as well as enjoying the benefits of public expenditure. In terms of
this kind of argument, goods which are ideal candidates for centralised provision,
because their benefits extend nationwide (or there are economies of scale) are foreign
                                                                                                                                           
it has in fact simply enshrined the favourable differential that existed in 1979.
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affairs, defence and interregional infrastructure such as transport and
telecommunications. But many other public goods have benefits that are locationally
circumscribed – such as the local fire department, street infrastructure, and spending
on health and education to name a few. Of course the efficient provision of these
goods or services may also be ensured in a system where private sector companies
have to enter a competitive bidding process for their provision.8 Indeed, if a single
private sector company is providing goods or services across a large enough number
of sub-central groupings they may be able to benefit from economies of scale.
De Mello (2000) has a nice general statement of some of the benefits of fiscal
federalism:
“The performance of the public sector can be enhanced by taking
account of local differences in culture, environment, preferences and needs,
endowment of natural resources and economic and social institutions. A better
match between the supply of public goods and local demands requires
information on local preferences and needs; this information can be extracted
more cheaply and accurately by local rather than by central governments. This
is because local governments are closer to the people and hence more
identified with local causes, more sensitive to local problems and more
responsive to local demands. Fiscal decentralisation consists in this respect, of
shortening the informational difference between the providers and recipients
of public goods and services so as to reduce information costs and boost public
sector efficiency in service delivery.”
This argument supports the devolution of the spending function of government to
Scotland as in theory her residents are better able to express their preferences for
public goods and services through Scottish politicians in Edinburgh than through
Westminster where Scottish representation is diluted. But the Scotland Act did not
devolve the necessary tax powers so that Scotland could operate as an effective
‘benefit unit’.
                                                
8 See Tanzi, 1999.
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The idea of a benefit unit encompassing decision-making over both costs as
well as benefits has a long lineage in economics.  As long ago as 1956 Charles
Tiebout argued that the idea of a benefit unit applied even, perhaps, especially, when
households and firms could vote with their feet.  That is, mobile households and firms
could choose the particular benefit unit that supplied the public goods and services
that they most wanted.  The distribution of households would be rational as long as
each paid the full cost of the goods and services supplied. This benefit unit argument
– paying for what you get (in a world of either geographically mobile or immobile
households and firms) is important for two main reasons.  First, because the quantity
of public goods and services supplied will be neither too large nor too small. When
the cost and benefit of the last few items of a public good produced are equal
production is at the right level.  If the cost of the last few units (i.e., marginal cost) is
greater than marginal benefit, the provision of public goods is too great.  When
marginal costs is less than marginal benefit there is a case for expanding provision. It
is for this reason we argue in favour of some devolution of taxes to facilitate a
marginal tax rule (discussed below). Secondly, tax costs are properly apportioned to
benefits, taxes are non-distortionary in that they do not adversely affect the locational
decisions of households or firms. Moreover, if costs vary between regions the case for
fiscal federalism is strengthened. Where interregional cost differences exist a SCG
can take advantage of this to improve welfare – providing more of the public goods
that have low costs and less of those with high costs.
However, other factors moderate the case for fiscal federalism. For example,
where important spillovers exist or there are economies of scale in public provision,
the theoretical presumption is that CG should either supply these public goods or that
the tax system should reflect these effects (we consider this below).
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Macroeconomic stabilisation and income distribution
As we have seen, the fiscal federalism literature contends that public goods
and services whose benefits extend nationwide should be provided by the centre
(examples of these would be defence, social security and international relations). The
theory also contends that functions of macroeconomic stabilization and income
redistribution should also be left with central government. With high capital mobility,
a fixed exchange rate and a unitary interest rate, fiscal expansion in a single region
within a country would spillover into other regions. Even so, coordination of fiscal
policy at the regional level is not impossible, especially if orchestrated through CG.
Redistribution at the local level is hampered by the mobility of households. For
example, the provision of more generous social security in one region will likely lead
to an influx of poor and an exodus of higher income individuals who have to bear the
tax burden. Should fiscal federalism prevail, Scottish politicians should remember this
simple fact – using SCG budgets to perform income and benefits redistribution could
well have serious adverse consequences. In many cases the well-off can easily move
their primary residence out of Scotland.
We return to a discussion of these issues from the revenue perspective in
section II and also in the context of our proposals for Scotland in Section III.
I.ii Hard and soft budget constraints
In Part II we discuss the kind of taxes and grants that would be required to match
expenditure in Scotland. As we shall see, grants are needed in any fiscal federalist
solution in order to ensure that the objective of needs equalization is satisfied.
However, the principle of equalisation, effected by a bloc grant raises the moral
hazard issue caused by the lack of a hard budget constraint on public spending in
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Scotland.  If a region knows that the size of the bloc grant it receives is related to the
size of its fiscal imbalances, the incentive to reduce its fiscal imbalance is
compromised: the region in effect faces a soft budget constraint. Relevant to what we
are talking about is the so-called “flypaper effect”: namely that ‘money sticks where it
hits’.  Money received in the form of a bloc grant from the central fiscal authority will
be spent, rather than used for regionally focussed tax cuts, by the regional fiscal
authority.9 Equally a cut in the size of grants from the centre leads to lower
expenditure at the devolved levels.10
The ‘new fiscal federalism’ (Oates, 2004) takes a public choice perspective.
This contends that politicians and civil servants are not seen as necessarily behaving
to maximize the welfare of the electorate; rather they are concerned with their own
utility – and for reasons of personal satisfaction, having control over a large budget is
better than a small budget. This public sector as a monolith (Leviathan) argument is
now influential and implies that fiscal federalism acts as a constraint on the behaviour
of a revenue-maximizing government.11  At issue is how to align more closely the
decisions of politicians and bureaucrats (the agents) with those of the electorate (the
principal).  From this public perspective horizontal tax competition between regions
has the dual benefits of stimulating private enterprise and reducing the scope for
wasteful government spending and therefore increased fiscal decentralization should
limit the size of the public sector.  Further, given this combination of benefits,
increased tax competition between jurisdictions need not mean reduced provision of
public goods.
However, the ability of intermediate tiers of government in the UK to compete
on their respective fiscal packages is limited to the extent that it is only the Scottish
                                                
9 See Hines and Thaler, 1995
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Parliament which currently has the ability to change taxes and many of the significant
UK regions, such as the North of England, do not have an elected assembly which
could compete on taxation and expenditure. Competing tax jurisdictions don’t exist in
the UK. And even if they did, factor mobility, particularly labour mobility, is known
to be limited in the UK, and so it is unlikely that tax competition would have its
desired effect. Furthermore, empirical studies testing the ‘Leviathan’ hypothesis have
produced conflicting results.12
Cooperative federalism’ (coordination of tax regimes between federal units)
can serve governmental interests rather than those of their citizens.13  Generally, the
constitutional expert Ronald Watts (1996) comes out against excessive cooperative
federalism as there is some ‘democratic value in competition among governments to
serve their citizens better” (page 55). Indeed, Canada’s Representative Tax system
(RTS) that allows provinces to obtain the same fiscal revenues when they levy the
same tax creates perverse tax incentives in entitlement receiving provinces.14 Since
the formula is based on tax bases there is no incentive for a receiving province to cut
its tax rates to attract inward investment, thereby increasing its tax base because its
entitlement under the RTS system would be correspondingly reduced.  Also, tax rates
in receiving provinces might be set too high because there is no financial penalty for
reducing the tax base – any lost revenues caused by relocation of producers avoiding
the high tax rates is offset by the entitlement payments.
An example of the soft budget constraint in Scotland might be that poor
Scottish standards of physical health are used as an argument for more public
spending on health in Scotland supported by a commensurately larger grant from
                                                                                                                                           
10 Stine, 1994.
11 See Buchanan and Brennan, 1980.
12 See, for example, Oates (1985), Grossman (1989) and Ehdaie (1994).
13 Breton quoted by Watts, 1996.
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Westminster. However, with a hard budget constraint on public spending the Scottish
Executive and Parliament might be encouraged to treat poor health in Scotland
differently, by moving further towards preventative measures within health spending.
Relevant fiscal measures might include public education through the schools of the
causes of poor health, and higher taxes on health-compromising consumables
However, the benefits of moving to a harder budget constraint might be lost
unless central government can credibly commit to its budget constraint. This is a so-
called “time inconsistency” issue. Unless central government can credibly commit not
to rescue an over-spending SCG or distance itself from political pressures from SCG
to raise spending limits, spending by sub-central government is unlikely to be
contained. The issue of time consistency has for some time now been regarded as a
key element in effective anti-inflation policies of central banks around the world. We
would argue that the concept of time consistency should also be a key element in the
design of a fiscal federalist system in the UK and we see this as an important part of
the institutional framework which ensures the credibility of such a system. One way
of achieving time consistency is to have a 'no-bailout' clause15 in the financial
settlement with Westminster.  The exact nature of such a clause is at this time difficult
to foresee.  However, such a clause could be backed up with legislation that prevents a
bailout in pre-defined circumstances, and it is even possible to make members of the
Scottish Executive personally liable if a bailout did occur. It could also be further
reinforced by ensuring that any debt issued by Edinburgh was its liability and not
Westminster’s.
What might be compromised in a move to a harder budget constraint – the
closer matching of spending and taxing in Scotland - is the insurance function played
                                                                                                                                           
14 This is the argument of Smart, 2001.
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by central government.  Regions affected by adverse asymmetric economic shocks
may be supported by transfers from CG – but this is likely to be more difficult when
SCG spending and taxes are closely matched.  Such asymmetric shocks could well
occur if Scotland was, say, overly reliant on North Sea oil tax revenues, known to be
quite variable over time.  The trade-off between risk sharing and moral hazard is
problematic for the design of a system of fiscal federalism.16 One way around the
issue might be for central government to insure individuals (e.g., as with
unemployment insurance) thereby guaranteeing benefits to welfare recipients and
senior citizens.17 The discussion here reinforces the point made earlier that in
designing a fiscally federated structure for Scotland, care has to be taken in balancing
the vertical and horizontal aspects of a fiscal system. We return to the issue of risk
sharing below.
I.iii. Fiscal federalism and economic growth
Although fiscal federalism is not the central mechanism which creates economic
growth, there are nonetheless a number of arguments which suggest that there may in
fact be an important link. Here we consider these arguments and also the extant
empirical evidence which explores the links between fiscal federalism and growth.
The key economic argument in favour of fiscal federalism, that it improves efficiency
in the use of resources (“allocative efficiency”), should also apply in a dynamic –
economic growth – framework.18 For example, the ability of local politicians to better
reflect local preferences on education, innovation, private capital and the
infrastructure could have an important influence on growth.
                                                                                                                                           
15 See Oates (2004) and references therein.
16 See Perrson and Tabellini (1996) and Oates (2004).
17 See Perrson and Tabellini, 1996.
18 See Oates, 1993.
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A second argument, and one which we believe may be of considerable
importance for Scotland, is that the current devolution settlement for Scotland does
not give local politicians an incentive to improve economic growth in Scotland. At
present the Scottish Parliament is given a lump sum, based on the Barnett formula,
which is spent on public services and goods and politicians have little incentive to
spend much of the budget on improving economic growth since the benefits of that
improved growth, in terms of increased tax revenue, accrue to the exchequer in
London. Giving politicians in Scotland an incentive to improve economic growth
would effectively reward Scotland with the benefits of growth – thereby increasing
the incentives to promote it.
A third argument, which is related to the previous one, is that fiscal federalism
might not only provide incentives for local politicians to consider local preferences
but also to spend time searching for innovations in the production and supply of
public goods and services which could result in their costs and prices being lower.
A fourth argument in the theoretical literature is that by lessening the
concentration of political power and promoting some tax competition, fiscal
federalism loosens the grip of vested interest groups on public policy and this
promotes democracy and (longer term) economic growth.19 That said, achieving
allocative efficiency in practice has two dimensions: the incentivising dimension,
associated with greater revenue powers discussed above – and also improved
productivity on the spending side. Devolution has to provide the opportunity to realise
greater efficiency on the spending side – but many feel the potential has not been fully
grasped. For fiscal federalism to work the appropriate institutional framework has to
be in place including a willingness on the part of the local politicians to abide by the
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rules of a hard budget constraint.20 In this regard, one particular aspect of the Scottish
scene is that there is some evidence to suggest that Scotland is more producer
orientated and resistant to competition, particularly in public services, so undermining
the potential gains in allocative efficiency.
There have been a few empirical studies of the growth – fiscal federalism link.
Oates (1985), for example, showed, in a study of a mix of 43 industrialised and
developing countries, that the average share of central government spending was 65
per cent for the industrialised countries and 89 per cent for the developing countries:
industrialised countries therefore seem to have much more fiscal decentralisation than
developing countries. Therefore countries with high per capita income, which have
enjoyed sustained periods of economic growth to reach their current income levels,
have greater levels of fiscal decentralisation than low growth/ low per capita income
countries. But the key question here is: is fiscal decentralisation a cause or
consequence of growth? The evidence on causality is inconclusive.21 More recent
studies, based on regression analyses,22 report that there is a statistically significant
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and growth but, intriguingly the
relationship is often negative: increased fiscal decentralisation is associated with
slower growth.23 However, in general these studies are unsophisticated in the way
they treat causality and it is possible that the negative result is spurious. At best, it
seems, that the empirical evidence on the fiscal federalism - growth link is ambiguous.
                                                                                                                                           
19 Various statistical studies support the notion that fiscal federalism promotes growth.  These include
Oates, 1985, Bahl and Linn, 1992, Thieben, 2003, and Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992.
20 See Tanzi, 2001.
21 See, for example, Oates, 1999, and Bahl and Linn, 1992.
22 See, for example, Davoodi and Zou, 1998, Xie, Zou and Davoodi, 1999, Zhang and Zou, 1998,  and
Thieβen, 2003.
23 Thieβen’s study shows that in moving from a low to medium per capita income level there is a
positive association between fiscal decentralisation and growth, while the move from a medium to high
level of per capita income level produces a negative association.
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I.iv. Fiscal federalism and social capital
Recently a number of researchers have argued that decentralisation of fiscal policy, by
bringing government closer to the people, may strengthen social capital. Although this
literature probably has greater import for developing and transitional countries, it is
worth briefly outlining here. To quote De Mello (2000) again:
 ‘…social capital is a multidimensional concept, broadly defined as trust,
norms, and networks that foster mutually beneficial cooperation in society. It
involves civic virtue, interpersonal trust, social cooperation and cohesiveness,
and associational engagements among social groups’.
A somewhat narrower definition defines social capital as informal norms that promote
cooperation between individuals.24
Knack and Keefer (1997) try to extract a common element from the various
definitions of social capital:
‘all concepts of social capital have in common the idea that trust and
norms of civic cooperation are essential to well-functioning societies, and to
the economic progress of these societies’.
A number of researchers have associated social capital with growth. Growth
can be improved in countries where social and political institutions protect property
rights and discourage non-productive activities aimed at grabbing a large share of the
social product (i.e., what economists call 'rent seeking behaviour').  Such an
environment creates a pro-investment climate and fosters entrepreneurship, thereby
stimulating growth. Social capital can also stimulate growth by lowering the
transaction costs associated with formal mechanisms, such as formal legal contracts
and bureaucratic rules.25
Although there are a variety of determinants of social capital, from religion,
education and ethnic polarization, a number of researchers have argued that the
                                                
24 See Fukuyama (1999).
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vertical structure of government is an important determinant of social capital.26 There
are a number of reasons why the devolution of fiscal policy may improve social
capital.27 First, the basic economic (or, 'allocative') efficiency argument of the
traditional fiscal federalism model should imply that a government’s actions are more
easily monitored by the local community and this should help to foster transparency
and accountability in public sector actions. Hence the decentralisation of fiscal policy
should reinforce the perception of citizens that local governments respond to their
needs and preferences faster and more effectively. That said this theoretical gain can
only be realised if there is also a focus on allocative efficiency on the expenditure
side.
Second, the decentralisiation of fiscal policy should lead to stronger links
between community groups and between the community in general and government.
With devolved policy making, local citizens are encouraged to take on more
responsibility for social and economic development and discussions between the
government and local communities tend to be greater. Again it is easier to enforce
social norms and contracts in smaller jurisdictions yet as devolution demonstrates it is
not clear that local societal norms are more favourable to securing allocative
efficiency, than those favoured by central government. The strengthening of these ties
is likely to promote social cohesiveness, civic virtue, facilitate interactions among
communities and discourage self interest.
Third, closer government encourages community-wide participatory
initiatives, such as the formation of groups, associations, and social/cultural activities
among community members. Such civic cooperation can improve allocative
                                                                                                                                           
25 The following authors stress the link between social capital growth: Abramovitz, 1986, Rodrick,
1998, and Knack and Keefer, 1997.
26 See La Porta, 1997) on religion, Heliwell and Putnam, 1999 on education, and Fox, 1996, on ethnic
polarization.
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efficiency if the total benefit to society of acting in a cooperative fashion outweighs
the total cost of non-cooperative actions. Fostering this civic level playing field
diminishes the payoff for citizens to engage in free-riding behaviour and illegal or
illegitimate activities, such as tax evasion, dishonesty and corruption.
De Mello (2000) seeks to test the link between fiscal federalism and social
capital.  He uses three social capital indicators: confidence in government, civic
cooperation and associational activity for 29 market economies.28 He 'explains' the
level of these indicators using five measures of the degree of fiscal federalism.  These
are two revenue-based indicators – SCG tax and non-tax autonomy, two expenditure
based indicators – the size and expenditure share of SCG, and vertical imbalances in
intergovernmental fiscal behaviour (which measures the gap between SCG
expenditures and own-revenue).29
The strongest and most significant relationship occurs for the vertical
imbalances indicator which exhibits the appropriate relationship with respect to the
different measures of social capital30; other indicators of fiscal decentralisation prove
to be statistically insignificant across all three measures of social capital.31 The
findings are taken to support the subsidiarity principle of public finance, which in the
traditional theory of fiscal federalism is justified in terms of allocative efficiency, that
social capital can be boosted when local differences in needs and preferences are
taken into account by policy makers.32 For example, confidence and trust in
government improves when the vertical imbalance is reduced. Since, as we have
                                                                                                                                           
27 The discussion here draws on de Mello (2000).
28 The data was originally collected by the World Values Survey for the period is 1980-81 to 1990-91.
29 The estimation is conducted by regressing the three different measures of social capital onto the
fiscal decentralisation indicators and a set of control variables.
30 It is negatively related to both Confidence in Government and Associational Activity and positively
related to Civic Cooperation.
31 The econometric results are shown to be robust to a sensitivity analysis.
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noted, there is an important vertical imbalance in the structure of fiscal policy in the
UK this would seem to reinforce the case for fiscal federalism in Scotland.
The above are some of the key theoretical considerations that face Scotland in
designing an appropriate fiscal structure. Some commentators have argued that these
kinds of arguments can best be addressed by moving to a system of complete
independence. One implication of the latter would presumably be that Scotland would
leave the UK monetary union. We therefore believe that it is important to consider the
issue of monetary independence in the context of a discussion of fiscal federalism,
since monetary and fiscal policy are, in a macroeconomic sense intertwined, and
indeed consideration of monetary union issues strengthens the case for fiscal
federalism.
I. v. Optimal currency area issues and the case for fiscal federalism
So far we have looked at a number of efficiency and equity arguments for fiscal
federalism. Another possible reason for the decentralisation of fiscal policy in the UK
is already of the monetary union that exists within the UK. The theory of so-called
optimum currency area literature suggests a number of criteria that should be satisfied
for a country or region, like Scotland, relinquish control over its monetary policy. If
these criteria are not satisfied, or are only partly satisfied, then decentralised fiscal
policy can act as a substitute. Of course, if the criteria are not satisfied then this begs
the question of whether Scotland should in fact be part of the UK monetary union. In
this section we consider the implications of the optimum currency area literature for
fiscal federalism, issues of macroeconomic risk-sharing within a monetary union and
the economic implications of Scotland leaving the UK monetary union.
                                                                                                                                           
32 Of course, these findings are suggestive rather than conclusive since the author has a limited data set
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I.v.a.  Monetary union, trade creation and exchange rate behaviour
We believe that it is strongly in Scotland’s interest to maintain the currency union
with the rest of the UK – i.e., continue to use the pound sterling, or, if the UK joins
the euro, then to adopt that currency. We argue for this because if Scotland did not
have the same currency as the rest of the UK it would face enormous strains on its
trade and investment linkages with what is easily its largest trade partner - the rest of
the UK.33 A floating exchange rate might impart unwelcome macroeconomic shocks
onto Scotland, trade with the rest of the UK might fall, or would be under strain as the
exchange rate floated, and costs would be incurred in restructuring Scottish trade
away from the rest of the UK.34
The logic of having a common currency between two regions is that by
simultaneously reducing transaction costs, currency risk and the opacity of relative
prices encourages trade. Studies looking at countries which have left a currency union
find that trade integration with the remaining members falls by about one-half from
the level associated with monetary union in the year or so immediately following
exit.35 Accordingly, if Scotland were to leave the UK monetary union, it might
experience a large and rapid fall in its trade with its largest trade partner – the rest of
the UK.36
A possible scenario is that even outside the UK monetary union, Scotland’s
trade intensity with it remains high for many years, but in the meantime Scottish
business is caught between the costly effects of exchange rate volatility on its trade
                                                                                                                                           
in terms of its cross sectional and time series dimensions and also because the measures of social
capital are rather crude and do not capture broader aspects of social capital.
33 Evidence for this, though not directly based on Scottish data, is found in MacDonald, 1999 and 2000,
Buiter, 2000, Layard et al., 2000, Glick and Rose, 2002, and Artis and Ehrmann, 2000.
34 Besedes and Prusa, 2003, show how difficult it is for countries to create new trade partners.
35 See Glick and Rose, 2002.
36 In the most recent year for which there is data, 2000, 51.3 percent of Scottish exports were to the rest
of the UK, the remainder being to the rest of the world.
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with the remaining members of the UK monetary union, and incurring the costs of
finding new trade partners in the EU and elsewhere.  We draw the conclusion that the
trade adjustment costs that Scotland would incur over the long-term from leaving the
UK monetary union would be drawn out and might be unacceptably high.  Indeed,
given that much of Scottish trade is in the financial services sector, and that this sector
trades almost exclusively with the rest of the UK, it is highly probable that this sector
would rapidly shift its operations over the border to avoid the vagaries of a flexible
exchange rate that would almost inevitably follow Scotland’s exit from the monetary
union.37
This brief overview suggests that it is in the interests of Scotland to maintain
its links with the UK monetary union. Given this, does the monetary union within the
UK constitute an optimum currency area and what are the implications of the
monetary union for fiscal federalism?
I.v.b. The optimum currency area criteria and the case for fiscal federalism.
In a monetary union a region gives up two instruments of macroeconomic
management - the exchange rate and monetary policy.  This may not matter from a
macroeconomic point of view - maintaining full employment and a stable price level,
given one of two conditions: either macroeconomic shocks are symmetric with the
rest of the currency area, or, if asymmetric, labour is mobile between regions.38
Although labour mobility is high within the UK, there are a number of
related issues worth noting. First, although labour may be willing to migrate, it may
                                                
37 Another interesting aspect of Scotland’s choice of currency area is the finding of Frankel and Rose
(2000) that the beneficial effects of a currency union work only through trade creation and not through
macroeconomic influences or the tying of monetary policy to a non-inflationary trade partner
38 The relevance of inter-regional labour mobility to the optimum currency area question was first
discussed by Mundell (1961). Kenen (1969) argued that the more industrially diversified a country, the
less asymmetric would be shocks – something that we take up later in this section.  McKinnon (1963)
argued that a high degree of openness - such as with Scotland's trade with the rest of the UK, suggested
a fixed exchange rate because changes in nominal exchange rates could not affect the real exchange
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not have the necessary skills to do so and it may take a considerable time for people to
retrain. Therefore, a region could suffer a prolonged period of unemployment. Also, it
is not entirely clear in the context of the UK that labour mobility is always going to be
the best shock absorber. Although it is difficult to cost, to the extent that people move
to the already congested parts of the UK it will contribute to the rather unbalanced
economy and housing market in the UK. Also, Scotland’s well known demographic
imbalance suggests it is worth discouraging movement out of Scotland and, indeed,
attract new talent in.39
Significant theoretical work has been done on the symmetry of
macroeconomic shocks at the regional level. Research on business cycle correlation
suggests that correlation is higher within countries than between countries.40 There is
not much difference between UK regions; the average correlation coefficient is
approximately 0.7.41
 The high regional business cycle correlation in the UK suggests that the role
of macroeconomic stabilisation should largely be left to CG. Indeed risks are pooled
or co-insured in a monetary union: if Scotland suffers an adverse shock relative to the
rest of the UK its payments to the centre fall while its receipts from the centre
increase. The type of risk can also be shared in a monetary union through highly
integrated capital markets which are usually associated with a high level of monetary
integration.42
                                                                                                                                           
rate due to an absence of money illusion. With its high dependence on export industries Scotland is
clearly an ‘open’ economy.
39 See Joshi and Wright, 2004.
40 See de Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke, 1993, Forni and Riechlin, 2001, Barrios et al., 2001, Clark and
van Wincoop, 2000.
41 See Barrios et al. 2001. See also Clark and Wincoop, 2000, for a broader international perspective
that finds a similar level of correlation. Rose and Engel, 2000, find that membership of a currency
union usefully raises business cycle correlation.
42 Kalemli-Ozcan et al. point out that with highly integrated capital markets, such as between Scotland
and the rest of the UK, there is a high degree of consumption risk-sharing .  A region suffering an
adverse shock being able to borrow from the other regions.
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It might be tempting to conclude that reduced financial market integration with the
rest of the UK – following exit from the UK monetary union – would reduce the
degree of specialization of the Scottish economy.  That would allow Scotland to
provide its own insurance against economic shocks. However, it seems plausible that:
(a) As capital market integration of Scotland with the rest of the UK and/or the rest of
the world will remain high, that leaving the UK monetary union will have little
effect on the degree of specialization of the Scottish economy.
(b) That even if capital market integration did fall, the degree of industrial
specialization would change only slowly so leaving Scotland’s specialized
macroeconomy open to asymmetric shocks.
(c) Less specialization in the Scottish economy following leaving the UK monetary
union, even if it did occur, would be undesirable because it would represent the
unwinding of the allocative benefits of specialization according to comparative
advantage.
We conclude that Scotland breaking its link with the UK monetary union would
have an adverse effect on its trade and investment. But there are grounds for using
regional fiscal policy for the purposes of economic stabilisation– especially as
continued outward labour migration might be undesirable both for Scotland and the
rest of the UK. There is a quite high correlation between regional business cycles in
the UK, but this does not completely rule out a local stabilisation role for fiscal policy.
There is some scope for stabilisation from the periphery as well. Hence the question
arises as to whether it is best to leave all of the stabilisation role to the centre?43 We
return to this question of the stabilising role for fiscal policy in Scotland in Section III.
                                                
43 This is essentially the view articulated by Krugman, 2003.
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We also point to the role played by sub-central government in macroeconomic
stabilization in several federal systems.
Part II: Objectives of an Effective Financing System: Principal Characteristics
and the Experience in Other Countries
In this part of the paper we consider the key objectives of an effective devolved fiscal
system, its principle characteristics and the experience in other countries of fiscal
federalism. The key objective of fiscally devolved system can be stated as:
• An optimal system of financing will seek to achieve appropriate horizontal and
vertical balance; that is, balance equity and efficiency considerations, without
undermining macro economic stabilisation objectives.
The principle implications for Scotland in moving to such a system involve:
• Trading off some equity in favour of stimulating greater allocative efficiency,
with anticipated knock-on benefits for growth.
The principal characteristics of such a system may be summarised as:
a. Expenditures and revenues are well matched through the assignment,
devolution and sharing of an agreed range of taxes
b. Appropriate intergovernmental transfer mechanisms are in place to ensure
equity considerations are not sacrificed
c. Provides for an agreed regional borrowing capacity
We now consider these characteristics in more detail.
II.i. The characteristics of a fiscalfederal solution.
Within the current devolution settlement many public goods are provided at the
Scottish level and therefore their provision may already reflect the differing
preferences within the Scottish community vis-a-vis the rest of the UK. However,
appropriate instruments to match this expenditure are not devolved. Currently local
spending in Scotland is not generally tied to the taxation decisions of a Scottish
Parliament. The Scottish parliament has limited income tax-raising powers which
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have so far not been utilised. The essence of the fiscal federalism argument is that
there should be a link between the benefits of public goods and services and their
price in the form of the tax raised to finance them. Since most key economic decisions
are taken at the margin, we believe that one key element in any successful fiscal
federalist solution is that it should have taxation at the margin as an important
component. This simply means that for any given fiscal settlement for Scotland, the
ability to increase expenditure in one particular area has to be paid for either by a
reduction in spending in another category or an increase in taxes.  We refer to this as
the marginal tax rule and discuss this in more detail in a Scottish context in Part III.
Here we focus on a theoretical discussion of tax related issues. First it is useful to set
out some nomenclature relating to taxation.
II.i.a. The assignment, devolution and sharing of an agreed range of taxes
An assigned tax is one whose proceeds are either shared between the different
levels of government on the basis of derivation (i.e. tax revenue is attributed to a
particular geographical area where it was generated) or equalization tax revenue is
allocated (on the basis of needs or resources)44. A devolved tax is one for which the
sub-central level of government possesses the power to vary the base and/or rate at
which that tax is levied. As we saw earlier, the key idea underlying a tax system in
which revenue is either assigned or devolved to the SCG level is that it communicates
to households and business units the cost of consuming different levels of local public
goods and services. Theoretically, this should result in a more efficient allocation of
these goods. The concept of needs equalisation is also worth defining at this stage.
Needs equalisation
                                                
44 Heald (1990) notes that assigned revenues can contribute a sense of ‘creating entitlement’ to the
revenues which he regards as ‘very important aspect to the fiscal psychology of the relationship
between devolved Parliaments and the UK Treasury’.
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‘involves the attribution of tax revenue (and explicitly public
expenditure) to particular geographical areas or units of government on the
basis of criteria other than derivation’ (David Heald, 1990).45
The tax assignment problem refers to the determination of the vertical
structure of taxes within a fiscal federation. There is vertical imbalance when
revenues raised by SCG are considerably less than expenditure – requiring some form
of subsidy from central government, as with the bloc grant received by Scotland from
Westminster.
The key point in designing a vertical tax structure is to attempt to match
revenue raising to expenditure levels. However, some areas have higher taxable
capacity – and so can provide more services for lesser tax levels – and as we noted in
Part I difficulties in designing a tax system arise where economic units are mobile.
Moreover, the mobility of economic agents, increases the more local the level of
government. A good example of this in the Scottish context would be the number of
households who use the services, such as art galleries and music, provided by
Glasgow city council but to avoid the (property) taxes levied to pay for these services
choose to live outside the city boundary.
At a Scottish level the ability to implement different expenditure taxes could
produce important distortions. For example, a higher rate of VAT in one region may
lead to locational inefficiencies which can show up in various ways, such as agents
engaging in unproductive travel costs to purchase the taxed items in lower-tax
regions.
Income tax
The distorting nature of differential regional taxes, combined with labour
mobility, on the face of it suggests that the Scottish Parliament should perhaps avoid
                                                
45 ‘Derivation involves the attribution of tax revenue to particular geographical areas or units of
government on the basis of where that revenue was generated’ Heald (1990)
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the differential taxation of labour – that is, personal income tax should not be
devolved. However, this is not necessarily correct. Rather, the Parliament should
avoid taxes on mobile households or firms which are not linked to any benefits, while
taxing economic unit for the benefits they receive from public services. By
communicating to taxpayers the cost of consuming local public goods should result in
an efficient allocation of these goods. So some devolution of income tax may well be
appropriate, as is indeed the case at the moment in Scotland. We return to a fuller
discussion of this point in Part III.
Corporation tax
This point equally applies to capital: levy benefit taxes on capital to the extent
that the government provides local inputs to business which increase the productivity
of capital. However, the broad thrust of the fiscal federalism literature is that the
ability to alter corporation tax should usually be left with the centre. The main
argument for this, as in the case of labour, is that of mobility: tax increases would
simply lead to relocation of the business elsewhere. Although tax competition in terms
of lowering taxes may seem appealing for a small open economy such as Scotland,46
the overall effect of such beggar your neighbour tax competition within the UK could
be to reduce total revenue available. But this is not necessarily the case.  It is possible
to argue during the early years after a region introduces a lower rate of corporation tax
that these lower taxes attracts capital and firms to that region resulting in higher taxes
in other regions.  However, if investment in the low tax region successfully promotes
R&D that causes positive productivity spillovers, all regions can enjoy lower tax rates
in later years.  This argument is similar to that of giving tax incentives to promote
                                                
46 For example, the experience of the Republic of Ireland, where corporation tax revenue has increased
even as tax rates were reduced, has often been cited as an example that Scotland could follow.
However, whether cuts in corporation tax would indeed produce the correct incentive mechanism for
Scotland is contentious. See Alexander (2003), Krugman (2003) and McGregor and Swales (2004).
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enterprise but cast in a regional fiscal framework.47 However, the problem with this
argument in the UK context is that not all regions have devolved parliaments and
there would not be able to compete on corporation tax. This is why an attempt by the
Scottish Parliament to engage in corporation tax competition would probably be to the
disadvantage of neighbouring regions, such as the North of England.
Natural resource taxes
Natural resource taxes are usually not seen as a suitable candidate for a local
government tax since the base for these is usually unevenly distributed across regions.
It has also been argued that the extraction of profits (or ‘economic rent’), from natural
resources should be the prerogative of the nation state and for the benefit of the whole
nation.48 Perhaps the most convincing argument against having a devolved natural
resource tax in the Scottish case is the potential volatility of revenue from its key
natural resource, namely North Sea oil. We discuss this in more detail in Part III.
Customs and excise and local purchase taxes
Customs and excise taxes and local purchases taxes are usually not regarded as
suitable for devolution, because it is undesirable to have rates differing dramatically
between regions which for one thing can produce the travel inefficiencies problems
referred to earlier.
Minor taxes
Other minor taxes such as betting tax, stamp duty, vehicle license, business
license taxes, TV taxes and various types of user fees for local services could all
potentially be devolved to the Scottish Parliament (as they are in some other
countries). Property taxes are also well-suited for devolution and they, of course, have
also been already devolved in the case of non-domestic rates to the Scottish
                                                
47 This argument is based on Hoyt and Jensen, 1999.
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Parliament49 and in the case of Council tax to the lowest tier of SCG, local
government across the UK.
So the gist of the above discussion is that there should be limits on
discretionary and differential tax changes on highly mobile economic units, especially
capital, in a decentralised fiscal system. That is, there are important issues relating to
the suitability of devolving the major taxes. On the face of it, this would seem to limit
the possibility of addressing the vertical fiscal imbalance which currently exists in the
UK. However, there is no reason why the key taxes discussed in this section should
not be assigned to the SCG and this could represent the major revenue source for the
Scottish parliament. But it is important, for the operation of the marginal tax rule –
that increased spending at the margin should be matched by increased taxes or
reduced expenditure in other areas - that some form of tax devolution occurs. We
return to these points below.
Non-benefit taxes
When the CG or SCG levies taxes that are designed to reflect the benefits
derived from a public good or service, they are referred to as benefit taxes. Non-
benefit taxes are necessary for the redistribution of income but these should be set at
the national level. Non-benefit taxes can be distorting because SCG ignores the effect
on the rest of the system. These inefficiencies include the exporting of tax burdens,
external congestion effects and equity issues that are associated with a regressive
pattern of tax incidence. If local levels of government levy non-benefit taxes they
should be in the form of resident-based taxes rather than source-based taxes as this is
seen as lessening tax-induced distortions by reducing the scope for tax exporting.
There is also a presumption for taxation of relatively immobile economic units. Since
                                                                                                                                           
48 See Norregaard, 1997.
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land is the most immobile economic factor and in inelastic supply, unimproved land
has been suggested as a source of tax as it would not produce locational inefficiencies.
Such taxes will simply get capitalised into local land values.50
Tax Base Issues
Although it is an alternative way for an SCG to raise revenue, there is a general
presumption in the fiscal federalist literature against allowing SCG units control over
the tax base. The traditional arguments against devolution of the tax base is that there
are significant costs of administration, significant fixed start up costs and also that it is
likely to impart a distortionary bias into the overall national tax structure. On the cost
aspect it may well be that the IT revolution has reduced (perhaps greatly) the costs of
administration, although the start up costs are indeed likely to be significant.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear to us that the distortionary aspects of different tax
bases are any different to the potentially distorting effects of different rates of tax.
Experience in the US certainly suggests that tax base devolution can be made to work.
However, this is clearly a highly technical issue and although it should not be ruled
out as a potential source of revenue further consideration of the costs and potential
distortions are required before it can be recommended in the UK context.
II.i.b. Intergovernmental transfer mechanisms
Intergovernmental grants can have three roles in a federated tax system:51 fiscal
equalisation across regions, improving the functioning of the overall tax system and,
thirdly, internalising the spillover effects to other regions. The theory suggests that to
limit spillovers from one region to another, conditional grants should be used to
finance a proportion of the SCG expenditures. Conditional grants can take the form of
                                                                                                                                           
49 In particular the non-domestic rate is set uniformly by the Scottish parliament and pooled centrally
across Scotland to equalise for different tax bases.
50 For more details on these particular matters see Gordon, 1983.
51 See for example Oates, 1999.
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matching grants, non-matching grants for specific purposes and bloc grants.
Conditional grants are designed to alter local priorities to take account of central
government preferences and there is a literature which shows that the optimal degree
of matching grant rate is the one which induces the SCG to provide the socially
optimal level of service.52 Such conditional grants are currently not part of the fiscal
set-up in the UK, although it would be necessary if components of expenditure with
important spillover effects were to be devolved.
The objective of fiscal equalisation (‘horizontal equity’) is usually thought to
be best achieved through the use of unconditional grants. These transfers are usually
based on the ‘fiscal need’ and the ‘fiscal capacity’ of each region, so that regions with
a high fiscal need-capacity ratio will receive a large transfer from the centre.  Scotland
may have a higher fiscal need due to its poorer health record and the greater
geographical dispersion of its population compared with the rest of the UK.
Unconditional grants are thought to produce a higher level of utility because this kind
of grant simply increases regional income without affecting local spending priorities
(which are determined by local preferences). The theoretical literature suggests that
unconditional grants should be lump sum in nature and not influenced by the actions
of recipient governments. Otherwise the system can degenerate into a system of ‘gap
filling’ (grants made simply to meet the deficits of SCGs) which conflicts with the
objective of disciplined expenditure policies. However, this literature does not give
any indication of the appropriate size of these grants and how they are formulated.
Matching grants have also been advocated for the achievement of the objective
of fiscal equalisation. For example, if the objective of the tax framework is to equalise
taxable capacity, the centre may decide to supplement the revenue of the poorer
                                                
52 That is, where the marginal social cost is equal to the marginal social benefit (Boadway and Hobson,
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region by matching the revenues raised in that region by some stated percentage. The
big advantage of this kind of system is that it allows all regions to raise the same tax
per capita for a given tax rate (irrespective of the size of their tax base)53.
The equalisation of intergovernmental grants from central to regional
government is not a necessary feature of fiscal federalism.54 For example, such
transfers inevitably have the perverse effect of transferring some income from poor
individuals who are located in the wealthy region to wealthy individuals located in the
poor region. Equalisation grants play a major role in a number of countries that have a
form of fiscal federalism (for example, Australia, Canada and Germany) but not in
others (for example, the United States).
A further issue is whether there is also efficiency as well as equity arguments
for fiscal equalisation. For in the absence of such grants, richer regions can use their
position to promote continued economic growth, some of which comes at the expense
of poorer ones.55  In this context, fiscal equalisation creates a level playing field for
the different regions.  It can be argued however, that such grants can impede
efficiency because they prevent necessary adjustment occurring at the regional level.56
In particular, they are seen to impede the development of the poor region by
preventing the necessary resource flows – especially of people, taking place.
We judge the equalisation principle to be one of equity. Since voters both in
the Scottish and the UK parliamentary elections voted for parties which subscribed to
the equalisation principle, we take it that this must be an important component of any
policy recommendation.
                                                                                                                                           
1993).
53 In the US this has been used to achieve equity across states for school finance and is referred to as
‘power-equalisation’.
54 As stressed for example by Oates, 1999.
55 Oates, 1999.
56 This argument is made by McKinnon, 1997.
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II.i.c. Borrowing capacity
We noted above that there are important arguments for having the redistribution and
macroeconomic stabilisation roles of government left at the centre and this means that
not all revenues should be devolved to the regions otherwise the Central Government
would have insufficient tax raising powers and there would be reversal of the current
vertical imbalance in favour of the SCG.
One way in which regions can supplement their revenue is by borrowing.
There are four models of how SCG debt accumulation is disciplined: market
discipline, ‘collegiate’ administrative discipline, rules based discipline and borrowing
targets set by CG.57 As we shall see in section II.ii.c., none of these are perfect. In the
meantime we turn to a discussion of the experience of taxation and borrowing in other
unitary and federal states.
II.ii The fiscal federal experience in other countries.
In this section we present a brief overview of the fiscal federalism experience in other
countries. First, we look at how the issue of the vertical imbalance of fiscal policy is
addressed in other European countries and then we go on to look at how fiscal
federalism works in federal countries.
II.ii. a. Sub-central government in other countries
About 60 per cent of public expenditure in Scotland already has been devolved to the
Scottish Executive. The devolution of expenditures on health, education, housing and
community amenities, social security and welfare, and general public services to
SCGs is common in many EU countries – though not all together in any single
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country58.  As many of these expenditure categories have also been devolved to
Scotland, in broad outline, the division of expenditure responsibilities is not so
controversial.
This, however, cannot be said of the division of taxing powers between SCG
and CG in the UK - a division that differs a good deal from that in many other EU and
non-EU countries.
It has been pointed out that:
“there has in recent years been a growing literature on the
arrangements in individual countries and on comparisons between them, and
the resulting exchange in ideas produced by this literature has itself played a
part in the evolution that can be observed in several countries” (OECD, 2002,
page 12).
So what can the UK learn from international practices?
Table 1 shows the composition of SCG revenues in eight EU countries –
divided into own-tax, non-tax and grant revenues. Most striking is the heavy reliance
– almost three-quarters of total revenues - that the UK has on grants to SCGs as their
main revenue source. SCG own-taxes in the UK amount to only 14 percent of SCG
revenues (these figures are UK wide). Leaving aside the Netherlands, vertical
imbalance is greatest in the UK.
Table 1: SUBCENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES: LATEST YEAR -
PERCENTAGES
Tax revenues Non-tax revenues grants
Belgium 79 3 19
Denmark 51 8 40
France 47 19 34
Italy 34 14 53
Netherlands 10 14 76
Spain 37 9 54
Sweden 75 6 20
UK 14 13 73
Source: OECD (2002, Table 3.3).  Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
                                                                                                                                           
57 This characterisation is based on Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997.
58 OECD, 2002, table 3.6.
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Table 2 classifies SCG taxes by tax base.  The almost total reliance on
property taxes in the UK is striking. This is in contrast to six of the other seven
countries. SCG taxes on income rather than property account for almost all of SCG
tax revenues in both Denmark and Sweden, for over 50% in Belgium, and over one-
quarter in Spain. Table 2 also shows data on revenues raised through taxes on goods
and services – expenditure taxes - at the level of SCG.  In the UK no such revenue is
raised, but about one-tenth of SCG tax revenues are raised from this tax base in
France, in Italy over one-quarter, and over one-third in Belgium (state level),
Netherlands and Spain.  Accordingly, table 2 shows that at the SCG level the UK is
alone among the eight EU countries in heavy reliance on grants from CG together
with an almost total dependency on property taxes as the single source of tax revenue.
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Table 2: CLASSIFICATION OF SUB-CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAXES BY
TAX BASE, PERCENTAGES (1999)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherland
s
Spain Sweden UK
Income and
profits tax
55 93 8 26 100
Taxes on
payroll and
work force
4
Taxes on
property
6 7 52 22 63 36 99.7
Expenditure
taxes
39 11 26 38 35
Other taxes 34 45 3 0.3
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: OECD (2002, Table 3.4).  Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding
Table 3 gives a somewhat more detailed picture of SCG taxes in the eight EU
countries.  In Belgium, following the Lambermont agreement of 2001, income tax is
regarded as a joint tax between the federal and regional governments. The regions
operate “on the margins”, meaning that they have power to alter the personal income
tax rates by plus or minus 6.75%, but may not change the tax base. The regions have
both tax base and tax rate autonomy over a large number of other taxes including
gambling and betting, real estate tax, the radio and TV fee, and the vehicle registration
tax.59  The OECD (2002), summarizes: “the regions now enjoy complete autonomy
over 40% of their revenue (regional taxes) and they have rate autonomy over the
remaining 60% (personal income tax). The Belgian regions however are required to
avoid double taxation with other jurisdictions, and not to engage in unfair tax
competition.  Moreover, they have no autonomy in the levying of VAT or corporation
tax.
                                                
59 See Gerard, 2001.
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TABLE 3: SUB-CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAXES: 8 EU COUNTRIES.
                                    Characteristics of SCG powers of taxation                                         Constitutional position
Belgium The regions have almost complete autonomy over 40% of their
revenues (regional taxes) and rate autonomy – but not tax base
autonomy, over the other 60%.
A federal country
Denmark Income tax covers about 90% of SCG tax revenues. Each SCG has
tax rate autonomy, but the tax base is set by central government. The
setting of tax rates is at budget time, so tax and spending decisions
are concurrent.  Municipalities tax rates range from 13-22+%.
Upper and lower limits are constrained by CG
A unitary state with
substantial subsidiarity to
polities in 275
municipalities and 14
county councils
France SCG does not control tax bases.  Communes, departments and
regions vote independently on tax rates.  Limits on rates are set by
CG
Regions have some
legislative powers
comparable to federal states
Germany The Lander regions have control over 63 per cent of tax revenue and
31 of expenditure taxes. Property tax is only a minor component of
the total revenue of the SCGs, Which is perhaps surprising given that
theory suggests it can have an important role to play in a devolved
tax system. (discuss meaning)
A Federal Country
Italy From 1992 tax responsibility transferred to SCG. From 2001 grants
replaced with VAT sharing – SCG can vary the tax rate within limits
set by CG. The tax base of the Regional Tax on Productive
Activities is the value of production less costs in each region.
Regional authorities have
some powers comparable to
federal countries
Netherlands SCG’s choose which taxes to levy within relevant Acts, and can vary
tax rates.
Decentralized unitary state.
12 provinces and 548
municipalities
Spain Tax sharing with central government, and SCGs can set their own
income tax rates but not tax bases.
Regional authorities have
some powers comparable to
federal countries
Sweden SCG tax revenue is from a single tax base – personal income.
Freedom to set tax rates but not rates.
A unitary state with
Constitutional protect of the
rights of local self
government to levy taxes
and determine tax rates
UK Council tax on imputed capital value paid by all tenants, with
discounts for single householders, direct to local government; non-
domestic rate set by Scottish and UK parliaments, respectively –
bases also vary between  Scotland and the rest of the UK. Scottish
Parliament can also alter the basic income tax rate within specified
margins but not tax bases. Size of bloc grants take into account level
of local taxes raised.
Unitary state of four
nations. In Scotland 32 local
authorities. In 1999
Westminster administrative
powers transferred to the
Scottish Parliament.
Source: extracted from OECD (2002).
In Denmark the SCGs largely control their own income tax rates, though not
income tax bases - which are defined by CG. Income tax rates can and do differ
between SCG tax jurisdictions in Denmark – lying between 13 percent and more than
22 percent (CG sets limits aimed at preventing very large disparities).
The combination of tax rate control by SCG and tax base control by CG is also
a strong feature in France (mainly property taxes, expenditure taxes and other taxes),
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Italy (property taxes and other taxes), Netherlands (property taxes and other taxes),
and Sweden (income taxes).
In Spain the new law implemented in 2002 allowed for the regular review of
Financing the Autonomous Communities.60 In 2001 the Autonomous Communities
(ACs) were granted increased financial independence from central government – and
more is expected following the recent Spanish general election. Currently, each AC
shares in the yield of the personal income tax according to the amount of tax raised in
that jurisdiction. The share will gradually increase from 15 percent to 30 percent.61
Additional taxes ‘ceded’ to the ACs include those on net wealth, inheritance and gifts,
property transfer, stamp duties and the gambling tax.  The tax system is different in
the Basque country and Navarra.  These ACs receive all revenue from central taxes
raised in their areas and then return a portion to the central government.
The Spanish Autonomous Communities are also able to introduce new taxes as
long as they do not duplicate taxes already in existence. Given that Spanish central
government has already introduced a range of taxes on most sources of revenue, this
has led to the emergence of imaginatively titled taxes such as ‘green taxes’ which are
on closer scrutiny simply traditional taxes presented in an imaginative way.62
 II.ii.b Some federal countries
In this section we consider the extent of fiscal decentralisation in some key federal
countries. In summary, what the evidence from these countries shows is:
• Federal countries exhibit a mixture of tax sharing, assignment and devolution
of tax bases;
                                                
60 See, for example, Gali, 2002.
61 See OECD, 2002.
62 On occasion these taxes have been challenged in the Spanish law courts.
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• there are common patterns in federal countries in terms of the types of taxes
that are typically reserved, assigned and devolved;
• practically all countries (the main exception is the United States) have
extensive equalisation systems – typically by transfer grants.
Table 4 shows the structure of state revenues in three non-European federal
countries. In each case there is substantial reliance on at least two tax sources.
Income taxes are major sources of tax revenue in Canada and the USA.  Expenditure
taxes on goods and services are important sources of tax revenue in all three countries.
Australia is a little different from the other three federal countries in that there is no
state tax revenue from income taxes while there is quite heavy reliance on property
taxes – two features also found in the case of Scotland. The Australian states have
heaviest reliance on expenditure taxes – as do the states in the USA, and to a lesser
degree in Canada.
TABLE 4: STRUCTURE OF STATE TAX REVENUES AND GRANTS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF STATE INCOME IN 3 FEDERAL COUNTRIES
Income tax
(as % of total
tax income)
Property tax
(as % of total
tax income)
Expenditure
taxes
(as % of total
tax income)
Other taxes
(as % of total
tax income)
Grants as a percentage
of State government
income
Australia 0 30 41 29 59
Canada 43 4 40 13 22
USA 37 4 56 3 29
Source: Norregaard (1997), table 3, based on IMF Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook.
One striking feature of Table 4 is the importance of grants from the centre to
the sub-central tier of government even in well developed federal systems – it ranges
from 22 to 59 per cent. The figure of 22 per cent is in fact the lower bound
internationally (for example from Table 2 we note that in the Netherlands where they
do have fiscal decentralisation, the bloc grant component is 76 per cent) and indicates
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that in any new fiscal settlement for Scotland there will always be a Barnett, or bloc
grant, component. As we noted in Part II, theory has clear prescriptions about how
that bloc grant should be defined. Canada uses the overlapping income tax – CG sets
the tax base while SCG sets its own tax rate, which is similar in form to the so-called
‘tartan tax’.  The USA goes a step further, allowing the states to vary the tax base
using various tax reliefs.  Coordination between SCG and CG is practiced in Canada
but not in the USA. Also, with an eye to keeping overall personal income tax rates as
low as possible, in the USA state income tax is deductable from federal income tax.
The downside of this is the moral hazard that SCG electorates do not necessarily bear
the full opportunity cost of their spending decisions because the reduction in federal
income tax payments is tantamount to tax exporting.
The tying of SCG expenditures and own-revenues more closely together in
many countries goes someway to imposing a hard budget constraint on SCG.  This is
expected to be helpful in promoting rational resource allocation by SCG by
eliminating the moral hazard caused by the exclusive use of CG grants, especially
when local polities assess true regional needs than is the CG.
One interesting aspect of the federal tax structure in Canada is that corporation
tax rates are allowed to vary across provinces. Corporation tax rates weighted by
sector vary from a low of about 9 percent in Quebec to a high of 17 percent in
Manitoba. Nine of Canada’s ten provinces have rates in the 13–17 percent range.
There is an inverse relationship between changes in corporation tax rates and inter-
provincial differences in the growth rate of reported corporate profits. That is, cutting
provincial corporate income tax rates results in faster provincial profits growth.63
                                                
63 These findings are drawn from Robson and Poschmann, 2001.
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An inverse relationship between the cost of capital (including corporation tax)
and capital accumulation has also been found.64 Taken together these findings suggest
that a province can increase its rate of capital accumulation by reducing its rate of
corporate income tax.
But does competition in corporate income tax rates causes a ‘race to the
bottom’? While it seems that rate competition exists between Ontario and Alberta, and
there is weaker evidence that Quebec competes, there is no evidence that the Atlantic
provinces do.65  Competition in corporation tax rates between provinces may be weak
because provinces also compete to attract capital and productive labour through the
supply of public goods that have to be financed through taxes. However, the Canadian
experience is at odds with the experience in some other countries and the success of
the policy in Canada is probably a reflection of the size of the Canadian regions and is
unlikely to be successful in federal systems where the regions are much smaller in
terms of their physical size.66
The OECD (2002) reports the results of a questionnaire on the extent of base
control in a number of OECD countries. Unfortunately, the results are difficult to
interpret since control over the tax base and 100 per cent tax devolution are usually
conflated, but where the separation is clear it would appear that control over the tax
base is limited in other countries.
II.ii.c. Borrowing by regions in other countries
One way in which regions can supplement their revenue is by borrowing. Here we
consider the borrowing behaviour of SCGs in other countries. There are four models
of how SCG debt accumulation is disciplined: market discipline, ‘collegiate’
administrative discipline, rules based discipline and borrowing targets set by CG.67
None of these is perfect.
                                                
64 See Gendron, Anderson, Mintz, 2003.
65 See Robson and Poschmann, 2001.
66 See Norregaard, 1997.
67 This characterisation is based on Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997.
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A few high-income countries allow SCG borrowing disciplined by-and-large
by capital markets.  These include Canada, Finland, Portugal and Sweden. Four
conditions are necessary for effective market discipline. Markets must not be required
to treat governments as privileged borrowers, there should be adequate information
flow to lenders on SCG financial and economic conditions, bailout should be
excluded – to prevent moral hazard, and borrowers should have in place institutional
arrangements that promote adequate response to deteriorating credit ratings should
these occur.68  Given the high level of development of UK financial markets, one
might think that such a system could work here. But there are dangers: even in such a
highly developed market economy as Canada, market discipline has not been tight
when judged by the rapid increase in provincial indebtedness and deterioration in
provincial credit ratings.  Only with a lag of more than a decade have the most
indebted provinces acted meaningfully to contain growth in their indebtedness.69
There is a warning here in that the efficiency gains expected from tax devolution may
not appear very rapidly, and this is an extra argument against full fiscal federalism.
Rules based systems – where the rules are specified in laws - are in place in
the USA, Spain and Japan. Thus, borrowing at some levels of SCG is limited to the
estimated debt service capacity of a SCG or to some other indicator of
creditworthiness. A rules based system also has the advantages of transparency and
evenhandedness. The main disadvantage of this system is that SCG may attempt to
circumvent the rules by, for example, reclassifying current spending as capital
spending or moving some spending off balance sheet.
In a collegiate administrative system the centre and the region agree what is
thought to be reasonable borrowing limits within dimensions such as the perceived
                                                
68 See Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997.
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needs of SCG, the overall fiscal balance and macroeconomic condition. There is an
obvious political dimension in the bargaining process that may promote short-term
political interests at the expense of excessive borrowing by SCG. Indeed, the
Australian system of administrative controls – whereby the federal and state
governments agree borrowing limits in the Loan Council, has been supplemented with
efforts to introduce some market-type discipline.70
A fourth debt management arrangement is that of direct control of SCG
borrowing by CG. This is the system in effect in the UK whereby CG annually
approves borrowing limits for local authorities and restriction may be placed on the
loan characteristics including the term and type of loan.71 Inflexibility is a possible
disadvantage of this method of control, especially given informational advantages on
local needs that SCG may possess in comparison with CG.
In sum, the main message from Part III is that the vertical fiscal imbalance that
we observe in the UK is at odds with the experience elsewhere in Europe and in non-
European countries with federal arrangements. In particular, other countries place
much greater reliance on addressing vertical fiscal imbalances using expenditure and
income taxes, rather than relying almost exclusively on property taxes.
Part III. Fiscal Federalism: A Scottish Perspective
In this section we turn to a more detailed discussion of the implications of fiscal
federalism for Scotland and the rest of the UK. We start by giving a brief overview of
the current picture with respect to taxation and spending in Scotland. We then go on
to present a sketch of what a fiscal federalist system might look like for Scotland,
based on the arguments made in previous sections. We follow the pattern of Part II
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and discuss the choices for Scotland around the three key dimensions highlighted
there, namely:
• revenue raising issues;
• the design of a grant system;
• and the borrowing options.
First, though, we set the scene in terms of the current Scottish position.
III.i The Scottish position
Under the Scotland Act (1998) various expenditure functions have already been
devolved to Scotland, mainly in the areas of education, health, agriculture, economic
development and transport, environment, law and home affairs and social work and
housing. Reserved matters are retained by Westminster and include defence,
employment, financial and economic matters, social security and international
relations. In terms of our previous discussion, this division appears to be rational in
that expenditures on reserved items yield UK-wide benefits and might also enjoy
economies of scale.  Moreover, the benefits generated by devolved expenditures are
probably more localized, and as we have argued in Part I local polities are likely to be
better placed to identify potential benefits than is distant central government (CG).  It
is economically rational that sub-central government should be in charge of these
expenditures.
In the period 2001-02 so-called identifiable spending (that is, spending which
can be identified as having been incurred on behalf of the population of a particular
country or region) in Scotland was £31.6 billion; the break-down of this expenditure
is given in Table 5, with the figure for the amount of devolved expenditure recorded
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in brackets. The breakdown of non-identifiable expenditure, which totalled £4b, in
2001-02, is also given in Table 5 and this is calculated using Scotland’s share of UK
GDP. To obtain Scotland’s total expenditure in this period, other items of expenditure
(namely, the sum of Local Authority and Central government debt interest and other
items £3.8b) are added to the sum of total identifiable and non-identifiable
expenditure to get an overall expenditure figure of £39.4b. In terms of identifiable
expenditure, it is clear that the Scottish Executive already has control over the
majority of spending units with the exception, of course, of social security.
Table 5: Identifiable and non-identifiable total managed expenditure in Scotland
2001-02
Identifiable (total) £m Non-identifiable(Total) £m
Defence 2,069
Overseas services 432
Education 4,992 (4,992) 1
Health and personal social
services
7,266 (7,266)) 19
Roads and transport 1,159 (985) 1
Housing 1,151 (1,151) -
Other environmental services 1,703(1,656) 1
Law order and protective
services
1,754 (1,541) 1
Trade, industry, energy and
employment.
1,225 (766) 243
Agriculture, fisheries, food and
forestry
1,351 (595) 45
Culture media and sport 643(454) -
Social security 10,163 663
Miscellaneous expenditure 225 (202) 551
Total 31,632(19,607) 4,026
Source: GERS (2003). Numbers in brackets refer to identifiable expenditure by the
Scottish Executive.
The revenue side of the picture, excluding oil, is given in Table 6. As the
GERS report recognises, these numbers are imputed and are open to some debate and
historically fiercely contested by the SNP, although less so recently72 However, a
debate about the validity of these numbers is beyond the remit of this paper and we
take the official figures as those most relevant for our discussion (this is the view of
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other independent commentators – see Jones, 2002). In any case, the actual size of the
deficit or surplus does not affect the underlying principles.
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Table 6 Revenues, 2001-02. £m
Income tax (after tax credits) 7,490
VAT 5,160
Social Security contributions 5,230
Local Authority Revenues 3,060
Corporation tax (ex North Sea Oil) 2,380
All other revenues 8,040
Total receipts 31,360
Source GERS (2003)
The gap between expenditure and revenue implies a non-oil deficit for Scotland in
2001/2 resulting in net borrowing of £8b, or a deficit of 10.3 per cent of Scottish
GDP. However, if all of the revenue from North Sea oil were to be apportioned to
Scotland the gap between revenues and expenditure falls to £2.8b (or 2.8% of GDP).
Alternatively, if 33% of of North Sea Oil is included the deficit is £6.4b, or 7.4 per
cent of GDP, while if 70% is included the deficit falls to £4.4b or 4.7 per cent of GDP
(see GERS, 2003)73. We return below to some issues relating to the inclusion of oil
revenues as part of the revenue base for a fiscally devolved settlement for Scotland.
The current formula for spending allocation in Scotland is based on the
Barnett formula.74  This formula only relates to the expenditure items currently
devolved to the Scottish Parliament and this therefore means that approximately 40
per cent of identifiable public expenditure in Scotland falls outside the remit of
Barnett. The formula is a way of sharing changes (not the level) of public spending
plans between the participating countries of the Union. Scotland receives a
population-based share approximately 10 3/80ths per cent of the total changes in
planned spending on analogous programmes in the Union. The Barnett formula,
developed in the late 1970s and used for the first time in 1978, was intended to deliver
gradual convergence of the higher level of per capita spending in Scotland towards a
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equal per capita expenditure in each of the regions – this is the so-called Barnett
squeeze. The bloc grant formula is regarded as reflecting ‘Scotland’s fair share based
on her relative needs’ – HM Government, 1993. However, since the formula itself is
based on population shares, it does not necessarily take into account or reflect
spending needs.
The Barnett squeeze arises because increases in funding are calculated on a
per capita basis, rather than the current baseline level of spending. Because the
devolved parliaments have higher per capita spending than England, a given
percentage increase in public spending in England would produce a smaller
percentage increase in Scotland.75 In practice, though, there have been a number of
ways of by-passing the formula and protecting the initial higher levels of spending per
capita in favour of Scotland. Indeed the original expenditure bias in favour of
Scotland has been protected automatically by the fall in the population of Scotland
relative to the rest of the UK and which has tended to offset the squeeze.
There are also anomalies in Barnett relating to expenditure which is outside
the remit of the formula (House of Lords Select Committee, 2002-2003). For
example, there may be some form of shock which arises in Scotland or in the rest of
the UK, such as foot and  mouth disease, which requires compensation and funding
from outside existing budgets (otherwise there would be major disruption to other
services) and a claim on the UK Reserve. But as House of Lords (2002) notes, at
present the Treasury determines how such funds will be paid and it also retains
control over the criteria by which it makes its decisions. A similar set of issues arises
with respect to EU funding for Scotland. For example, in the past Scotland has been in
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by 5 units public spending will have increased by 5 per cent. If per capita spending in Scotland is 120,
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receipt of Objective One funding from the EU.  This was initially channelled through
Westminster and concern has been expressed about whether all, or any, of this
funding has in fact been passed on to the devolved parliament (House of Lords 2002).
The UK government is also supposed to add to original funding – the so-called
additionality in spending – and it is unclear if this has in fact taken place.
The Barnett formula is not a good platform on which to base a future fiscal
federalist structure for Scotland. Barnett is an unconditional grant and is one which
focuses almost exclusively on the equalisation function at the expense of the kind of
allocative issues discussed earlier. It is therefore not a good mechanism for addressing
issues of allocative efficiency. As we have seen it does not reflect changing needs
assessment either, other than by arbitrarily protecting the initial spending share for
Scotland. We now turn to a discussion of some alternatives.
III. ii. Fiscal federalist alternatives to the Barnett formula
What does the forgoing theoretical analysis and comparative study suggest would be a
sensible degree of fiscal federalism in Scotland? Our discussion here is by no means
intended as the last word on this issue. Rather it is meant to contribute to the debate
over the most suitable federalist package for Scotland based on economic criteria.
III. ii. a. The full fiscal autonomy model and a critique
One advantage of a more fiscally federated structure is that by trading off some of the
equity aspects of the current arrangements greater allocative efficiency, of the type
discussed earlier in the pamphlet, may be achieved. Some, like the SNP, argue that
full fiscal autonomy must also be accompanied by ending the monetary union that is
the UK – this is a position of independence or sovereignty. Others argue merely for
full fiscal autonomy, trading off any equity considerations in favour of a revenue base
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entirely based on own revenues. This case for full fiscal autonomy has been made by
a variety of commentators and has received prominence in the Scotsman newspaper. 76
Some in the Liberal Democrats and Tories have also proposed full fiscal autonomy for
Scotland, although it is unclear how the equity/ efficiency trade off is to be addressed
in their models.  Indeed, there appears to be no desire for equalisation in this model
and, in essence, what is being proposed is a sovereignty position with no shared
services or obligations. Although some crave this within a federal or unitary structure
in the real world it does not exist for two key reasons. First, the most efficient way to
implement the kind of sophisticated social security systems which exist in most
countries today is at the national or central level rather than at the sub-national level
and, second, macroeconomic stabilisation should, for reasons noted earlier, be
conducted mainly at the centre. In essence what the full fiscal autonomy approach
amounts to is devolving the three economic functions of government – allocative,
equity and stabilisation – to the Scottish Parliament. We refer to this model as the
‘straw man’ autonomy position. We regard the full fiscal federalist position as a straw
man since it does not currently exist in any unitary or federal country.
In this ‘straw man’ model all tax raising levers - income taxes, expenditure
taxes, corporation tax, North Sea oil tax revenues etc – are devolved to Scotland and
the Executive then becomes responsible for all of Scotland’s public spending needs,
including a payment to Westminster for reserved services.77 The ’straw man’ view of
the impact of fiscal federalism seems close in spirit to the recent theoretical literature
on fiscal federalism, discussed in Part I in which the interaction of a hard budget
constraint and the need for credible commitments may produce huge public sector
savings/ economies by reducing the scope for wasteful spending and stimulating
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private enterprise and by altering priorities, say, in spending towards preventative
healthcare, for example.
Equity versus efficiency
  In going for full fiscal autonomy, the objective of equity has been abandoned
in favour of a policy which theoretically may maximise efficiency. Indeed, there is an
important contradiction in this model between efficiency and equity. For example,
there can be little doubt that the implementation of these policies would lead to a
significant reduction in spending in areas which had previously been regarded as
important for needs. This shortfall would be met by an unconditional lump sum grant
(which we note is what the theory in Part I deems as appropriate) in a less than fully
decentralized system. However, the proponents of the full fiscal autonomy view
eschew the use of such grants. Doubtless proponents of this view would argue that in
the longer run the potential success of the policy would then enable a level of
expenditure which was commensurate with needs. However, it is unclear how long
that process would take and, in the meantime, the issue of equity could not be
addressed. The failure of the full fiscal autonomy model properly to address the equity
issue is one important reason why we do not in practice observe the full fiscal
autonomy model in any nation state.
Macroeconomic stabilization
A second important issue concerning the full fiscal federalist position relates
to the macroeconomic stabilization role of fiscal policy. At present, this is a
Westminster function and in most discussions of fiscal federalism the stabilization
role is classed with defense and foreign affairs as items which should be controlled
from the centre. In moving this function to the regional government ways would have
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to be found to supplement tax revenue so that recessionary induced budget deficits
could be financed. Scotland could do this by issuing its own marketable public debt,
in much the same way that the UK Treasury does, and as the states in the US do; or
for Scotland to have a line of credit in a pre-defined ‘time of need’ from UK
budgetary sources.  However, this would, in turn, create tensions, having implications
for the UK-wide public sector borrowing requirement, and may interfere with central
government macroeconomic policy.78 According to the IMF to prevent this happening
internal stability pacts need to be negotiated between the different levels of
government.79
In Germany, where SCG has significant borrowing powers, each level of
government is responsible for avoiding an excessive public deficit.  A centralized
agency, the Financial Planning Council, issues recommendations on budgetary policy
and facilitates discussions aimed at agreeing internal consistency.  In Italy, since
1999, targets are set for sub-central government deficits and if a target is missed fines
will be levied should Italy itself be sanctioned under the Maastricht Treaty.  Similarly,
in Austria, targets are set for sub-central government borrowing with fines for Lander
and local governments that do not meet these targets.  Even with these mechanisms it
can be argued that the management of fiscal policy in federal systems is more
complicated than in unitary systems: deficit targets for SCG can introduce a pro-
cyclical bias into spending at that level of government.80 It is important to note that
these conditions described the IMF relate to financing systems that balance both
equity and efficiency considerations as well as securing a reasonable vertical and
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79 See IMF, 2003.
80 See IMF, 2003.
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horizontal tradeoff. In short these countries do not have full fiscal autonomy. In any
full fiscal autonomy scenario the above potential tensions would be exacerbated and it
is highly likely that, the Scottish government would only be able to borrow on less
favourable terms than those available to and from the UK Treasury. There are also, of
course, the costs of setting up a bond market.
However, perhaps the most compelling argument against devolving the
stabilization role to the Scottish Executive relates to the close correlation between the
regional business cycles within the UK,  - noted in Part I. Given that many of the
shocks hitting the UK regions are closely correlated it does not seem efficient or cost
effective to have a separate macroeconomic stabilisation function for Scotland.
Pursuing a stabilization policy which is out of synchronization with the rest of the UK
would be sub-optimal because in a small open economy many of the benefits of the
policy would spillover into the rest of the UK. A centralized stabilization policy
effectively internalizes these spillovers and offers an important level of insurance to
regional governments.
The key revenue sources and fiscal autonomy
A third important issue relates to the suitability of devolving the key sources
of revenue, such as North Sea oil, VAT, corporation tax and income tax. Consider,
first, North Sea oil. Although there is certainly some independent academic support
for the view that the vast bulk of North Sea oil lies within ‘Scottish waters’ it is not
clear that this would be a particularly reliable source of revenue for the Scottish
parliament. For example, recent research has divided the North Sea into Scottish and
rest of the UK territories (UKR) using the principle of equidistance, that has merit on
the grounds of ‘equity, legality and precedence’.81 In the period post-1977 over 90 per
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cent of offshore UK oil production has occurred in Scottish waters. However, we
noted in section 2 that the fiscal federalism literature indicates that revenue from
natural resources are not a good basis to build a tax base at the regional level. For
North Sea oil this conclusion is reinforced because of the variability of the price of
oil. It has been shown that the Scottish share of the total tax revenues from North Sea
oil varied from 61 per cent in 1977 to a high of 98 per cent in 198282. The fickleness
of oil revenues is also reinforced by the fact that it is priced in terms of the US dollar:
a depreciation in the value of the dollar, relative to sterling, decreases oil revenues and
the recent sharp fall in the dollar suggests that this effect can be quite dramatic. The
volatility of oil prices, combined with currency volatility, leads us to discount using
oil revenues as a component of the tax base for the Executive. We would argue that
these are better channeled through central government, which with its access to a wide
range of debt instruments, is better able to offer insurance against the volatilities in
revenue that would arise from unanticipated currency and oil price movements. Of
course, this would not rule out the Executive having access to a bloc grant from the
centre which in effect represents the smoothed revenue stream from oil.83
VAT is also probably not well suited to devolution.  For one thing the
tendency within Europe is towards the harmonization of VAT and this would preclude
much, if, any variation within a national state and also from a practical perspective,
because it is a multi-stage tax, the devolution of VAT would be an ‘administrative
nightmare’ (David Heald, 1990). The devolution of both corporation tax and income
tax would in principle be feasible (however, there are considerable difficulties in
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83 Davis, et al. (2003) consider that ‘oil funds’ aimed at accumulating assets to be used to insulate fiscal
policy from fluctuations in oil tax revenues, in practice have a poor record. And, while Stancke (2003)
points to the successful operation of Norway’s Petroleum Fund, that experience may not be transferable
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unravelling the former) although the fiscal federalist literature indicates that care
should be taken in the variation of such since they are taxes on potentially highly
mobile units and this is especially true for differential taxes on capital.
So there is a degree of complexity and uncertainty, particularly with respect to
the issues of equity and stabilization, in the extreme case for full fiscal autonomy.
This hypothetical model turns out as going too far in trying to address the efficiency
function of fiscal policy at the expense of the equity and stabilization aspects. This is
presumably why we do not observe the full fiscal autonomy model operating currently
in any nation state.
III. ii. b. A proposal for tax assignment
Recognising the above problems, what might a fiscal federalist system look
like for Scotland? We are guided by the fiscal federalist experience of other countries,
noted in Part II, to propose a mid-way approach between the two extremes of full
autonomy and the current status quo. In other words we try to seek a balance between
the trade off between allocative efficiency and equity.
         An optimal system for the future will be one that delivers:
• A better balance between the horizontal and vertical aspects of fiscal policy;
• Trading off some equity in favour of stimulating greater allocative efficiency;
The improvement of allocative efficiency relates to the matching of the costs and
benefits of different expenditure categories and also efficiency gains in public
spending.
This will be achieved by a system that:
• extends the assignment of an agreed range of taxes and the devolution of a
further range of taxes;
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• preserves a significant equalization grant to ensure equity considerations are
not sacrificed, in line with good practice across the globe;
• provides for an agreed regional borrowing capacity.
This paper is not intended to be the final word on this given the complexities involved
in designing such a system. Rather it is intended as focusing the debate on some of the
important economic issues which should underlie the further evolution of the current
financial settlement. Below we try to sketch out the parameters of the choices for
Scotland and the UK against each of the dimensions outlined above.
Vertical imbalance
How may the vertical imbalances which exist within the UK be addressed? In
trying to answer this question it is worth at the outset listing the full spectrum of
choices available:
1. Devolving a particular tax, which gives the devolved authority the ability
to vary the base and the tax rate;
2. Devolving a particular tax, which gives the devolved authority the ability
to vary the base but not the tax rate;
3. Devolving a particular tax, which gives the devolved authority the ability
to vary the tax rate but not the base;
4.  Assign a share of a tax on a derivation basis and give the devolved
authority the right to vary the base and the rate;
5. Assign all or a share of tax on a derivation, or other basis, and give the
devolved authority the right to vary the rate but not the base;
6. Assign all or a share of tax on a derivation, or other basis, and give the
devolved authority the right to vary the base but not the rate;
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7.   Assign all or a share of taxes and equalise on a population, expenditure
needs or tax capacity basis, without right to vary the tax rate or base.
In trying to address the vertical imbalance that exists within the UK one
important constraint is the relatively small amount of regional autonomy that exists
elsewhere in the UK, particularly in England. For example, if all of the regions – say
the north, midlands and south – had access to devolved taxes it would be easier to
devolve a tax such as corporation tax because lowering corporation taxes in Scotland
could potentially be matched by lower corporation taxes in the North of England and
one would not have to take account of the beggar-thy-neighbour aspect of tax
changes.
Assigning and devolving taxes
We have argued previously that there is only limited scope for the devolution
of the main sources of tax revenue. However, even assigning more tax revenues,
without any actual devolution of either tax rates or bases, would in itself represent a
substantial step in hardening the budget constraint faced by the Scottish Executive and
Parliament.  The fact that the revenue share was coming to Scotland would create an
incentive to politicians to engage in policies which are growth friendly, especially if
the tax take is related to the income in Scotland. This would of course be reinforced if
taxes were also devolved and we have argued for this in terms of the marginal tax
rule.
  Taking the main taxes in turn, we have argued that North Sea oil is not a good
tax revenue base for Scotland and therefore we do not believe it should be devolved or
assigned. Although we have also argued that VAT in Scotland should not be
devolved, there is nothing to prevent the revenues raised from VAT being assigned to
the Scottish Executive. Heald (1990) notes four alternatives for the assignment of
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VAT. The proportion assigned could depend upon Scotland’s proportion of vat-able
final consumption, or upon a regional analysis of where the value added accrued.
Alternatively, assignment could be on the basis of a uniform per capita or per adult
basis. The advantage of the latter proposals is that they would assist equalisation
between the regions. Heald (1990) opts for a per capita basis because it is simple to
implement and would involve fewer technical controversies than the first pair. We,
however, favour linking VAT to final consumption since that would provide a link
between tax revenue and economic activity: the higher is economic activity the more
revenue is generated for the local polity.
Income tax seems equally suited to assignment and also has the potential to be
devolved. Indeed, under the current devolution settlement there is already the
possibility to alter income tax by +/- 3 per cent. So far this has not been used,
although on the principle of making households pay for the benefits of higher levels
of public expenditure, tax rises could be used to satisfy the demand for higher levels
of public expenditure.  Some commentators have argued that the amount is essentially
insignificant because it represents a very small proportion of total expenditure and
taxes. We would argue on the basis of the experience in other countries, particularly
Belgium and Denmark, that a wider discretionary band would be more appropriate. In
particular, the kind of variability of income tax, in Belgium, where the regions are
allowed to vary their rates by approximately plus/ minus 7 per cent would be more
appropriate or perhaps the even more bold option of no bounds on the bands should be
the objective. As we have argued previously although labour is usually thought of as a
mobile economic unit, there are reasons why variations may be advantageous.
Upward variation of income tax gives the Executive scope to, say,
communicate the benefit-cost trade off mentioned earlier to the electorate: if
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households in Scotland want to spend more on, say, health and do not want to reduce
spending on other areas they have to pay for this in terms of higher taxes. This is our
marginal tax rule. Although there may be some outward migration of labour from
Scotland as a result of this, the point is if this is the policy choice of the electorate
they should have that choice. However, we believe in the UK case the outward
migration of labour as a result of not too great tax increases is likely to be relatively
small. For one thing labour, in contrast to capital has ‘emotions’. There would appear
to be a strong sense of belonging, or home bias, in the regions of the UK. This shows
up in people in Scotland, and indeed other regions of the UK, wanting to stay near
their family/ roots rather than moving to some other region where taxes are more
advantageous. Of course this argument would only apply to those in employment or
who have their aspirations satisfied in their current job.
Another possibility – that takes account of the possible failure noted above of
the Scottish polity quickly to latch on to the link between designing an efficient tax
system, faster economic growth and a growing tax base, is to have an asymmetrical
tax-variation band. For illustrative purposes, this could be plus 3 per cent (as with the
‘tartan tax’) with no downside limit at all. We see the upside limit a restraining a
possible future Scottish government from an over-exuberant tax-and-spend, or
borrow-and-spend policy.
The ability to cut income taxes could also be used for a policy of matching
benefits and costs but we think there is likely to be an important asymmetry in the
case of a tax cut with respect to the movement of labour. This is because tax cuts may
well attract expatriate Scots back to Scotland if similar jobs are available in Scotland
compared to their current location. This kind of policy may help solve, at least in part,
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the population deficit that Scotland currently faces and its implications for economic
growth.
In principle, corporation tax is similar to income tax and would therefore seem
a natural candidate for assignment. An argument can also be made for devolving
corporation tax powers as well, along the lines of current UK policy within the EU.
Clearly, though, for a small open economy, and given the mobility of capital, tax
movements in an upward direction would lead to a rapid movement of capital
(presumably in the form of locational headquarters) from Scotland to the rest of the
world. Some commentators have argued that, as in the case of income taxes there may
be an important asymmetry here, in the sense that cuts in corporation tax could lead to
an inflow of capital which, in global terms, would be minimal, but in Scottish terms
could be highly significant. The evidence from the Canadian provinces, suggests that
such a policy can be successful within a federal structure and that such tax
competition does not produce a race to the bottom. However, most commentators
would argue that the reason it works in Canada is simply a function of the physical
size of the regions – they are very large, able to absorb the differentials and, of course,
all have the ability to alter corporation taxes.84 Although this policy would seem to
have been pursued successfully in Ireland, and the new EU members Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, and Poland all have corporation at less than 20 per cent , there exists
a debate about the suitability of such a policy for Scotland.85 And since other regions
in the UK do not have the ability to change corporation tax, tax cuts in Scotland could
produce a beggar-thy-neighbour outcome. So although corporation tax is well-suited
to assignment it is not clear that there is much scope for the devolution of this tax.
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Customs and excise duties are usually not regarded as suitable for devolution,
because it is undesirable to have rates differing dramatically between regions which
for one thing can produce travel inefficiency problems. However, these kinds of taxes
are likely to be amenable to assignment. Taxes which are better suited for devolution
are likely to be betting tax, stamp duty, vehicle license, business license taxes, TV
taxes and various types of user fees for local services. Property tax, already devolved,
is also likely to continue to be a good source of devolved revenues. In sum, our
approach to the devolving of tax powers to the Scottish Executive is one which
emphasises assignment rather than full devolution. However, we do recommend
devolution for income tax (for all rates) and a package of the minor taxes. In terms of
the former tax, the experience of other countries suggests that it would be worth
giving consideration to the devolution of tax bases as well. Table 7 summarises the
assignment and devolution aspects of the various taxes.
Table 7. A summary of the assignment and devolution of taxes
Type of tax Assigned Devolved Reasons against (assigning or)
devolving
Income Yes Possibly Feasible, but potential problems
due to mobility of tax source.
Corporation Yes Possibly Feasible, but difficulties in
unravelling tax source. Also
potential problems over
mobility of source. Easier if
English regions get devolution.
VAT Yes No Goes against EU harmonization.
Practical administrative
complexities.
Stamp Duty Yes Yes -
Customs+excise Yes No Can result in travel inefficiency
problems (border shopping)
Other duties Yes Yes In particular where these relate
to user fees for local services
North Sea Oil No No Highly volatile and regionally
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unevenly distributed
As we saw in Part II, assignment of taxes is quite common in other federal
systems and this generally involves assigning some proportion of the tax raised in a
particular region. Here we suggest some proportions which help to illustrate the
amount of revenue that would be generated on the basis of the 2001-02 GERS figures.
The choice of these proportions is not intended as definitive. In broad terms, we
believe it important to have a matching, or balance, between identifiable expenditure
and assigned (total) tax revenue and our chosen proportions are one way of achieving
this. We refer to this as a balanced tax assignment. Since economically rational
decisions are most likely to be adopted when decision-makers have to balance the
benefits of particular spending decisions with the costs of these decisions, we believe
that balanced tax assignment is an important element in achieving this, while at the
same time recognising that Scotland has to contribute to expenditure made by
Westminster, on items such as social security and defense. We recognize that there
may be other ways of matching revenue with spending and so in that sense we would
not defend our chosen weights as being the last word. Assuming that 50 per cent of
revenue raised in Scotland for both income and corporation tax was assigned to the
Executive, this would produce revenue streams of £3745m and £1190m, respectively
(on the basis of the GERS 2003 figures discussed above). Using a 75 per cent
proportion for VAT produces an additional income £3870m and applying the same
percentage to the sum of the duties on fuel, tobacco, and customs duties produces
£1770m. Taking a package of minor taxes (namely Stamp duties, Betting and Gaming
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duties and Vehicle excise duties) results in a further £900m of revenue.86 This
produces a grand total of £11,475 which represents almost two thirds of the total
identifiable expenditure made by the Executive in 2001-02 (£19,607). This kind of
general approach would go a long way to addressing the vertical imbalance that
currently exists in the relationship between the Scottish Executive and Westminster.
However, although the assignment of taxes is an important step towards fiscal
decentralization we believe that it is important from any initial starting point that
Scottish policy makers are challenged in their marginal spending decisions. So from a
starting point where some proportion of taxes have been devolved and a bloc grant
has been issued (see below) some mechanism has to be in place which forces the
policy makers to operate a cost- benefit analysis with respect to additional expenditure
and the method we propose is our marginal tax rule, introduced earlier: if the policy
maker decides to spend an extra £100m on, say, health either expenditure has to be cut
elsewhere or taxes have to rise. We believe the devolution of certain taxes – namely
income tax and a package of minor taxes – will achieve this.
It is likely that any fiscal settlement based on tax assignment/ devolution
would produce a fiscal deficit (i.e. an excess of expenditure over revenue) for
Scotland.  In order to deal with the horizontal imbalance resulting from this
assignment we would recommend an unconditional lump sum bloc grant which is
determined on the basis of a needs assessment exercise at the time of the move to a
fiscal federalist system. This is the kind of financing arrangement recommended in the
fiscal federal literature discussed in Part I. However, experience in other countries
suggests that this is not a straightforward exercise and it is likely to be an especially
tricky issue in the UK context since it is the first time such a decentralization of fiscal
                                                
86 Of the minor taxes mentioned earlier these are the only ones for which revenue data is available
78
policy has taken place. One way of addressing this issue, which would have a
smoothing effect around the transition, would be to have a lump sum bloc grant
derived at the time of the changeover to the new system set at a level derived to
achieve total revenues equal to Barnett and which could then converge to the new
needs assessment level over time. We also believe that, at least in the short-run, there
should be some mechanism in place to protect the lump sum grant if the Scottish
polity does indeed succeed in raising economic growth/efficiency and the overall tax
take. The idea being that in order a) to promote greater tax efficiency; and b) to
reward Scotland for taking on more risk, Westminster would need to realize that in
the longer-term the UK budget benefits from tax devolution to Scotland and that it
needs to leave an incentive in place for the Scottish polity to create greater tax
efficiency in Scotland (and hence the UK, Scotland being a part of the UK) – i.e.
Westminster should not, at least in the short run, cut the lump sum grant as Scotland
becomes more efficient in raising tax. In this regard it may be advantageous to follow
the Spanish system and review the fiscal structure on a regular basis (five yearly in the
Spanish case). If there still existed a fiscal deficit in Scotland after the application of a
bloc grant, further attention might have to be focused on how to raise additional tax
revenues. If surcharges on existing income and expenditure are ruled out, study of
practices in other countries would be fruitful, especially a study of how control of the
tax base may be used to increase total tax revenue. We noted in Part II that there are
important technical issues relating to devolution of the tax base and although we do
not view these as insurmountable, they do need further consideration before a hard
and fast recommendation can be made.
                                                                                                                                           
through the 2003 GERS statement. This figure could therefore be larger if other minor taxes were
included and also if changes in the rates of these taxes were permitted.
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 In our particular variant of the fiscal federal model, we propose that overall
macroeconomic stabilization would remain with the central UK government. With a
centralized social security system there is already an automatic stabilization effect: a
recession in Scotland relative to the UK is attenuated by reduced transfers from
Scotland to the centre and increased transfers from the centre to Scotland (this is the
risk sharing aspect of stabilization from the centre). Could there be an additional
discretionary role for the local government to stabilize the economy?  The correlation
between regional business cycles in the UK is not perfect. Paul Krugman (2003) has
suggested that this would not be a useful way of using fiscal federalism in Scotland,
essentially because it does not seem to have worked in other countries such as the
USA. However, in the USA the constitutional arrangements by-and-large require
states to balance their budgets on an annual basis which may explain why regional
countercyclical policies have been unsuccessful.  Although we recognize that the
management of a limited counter-cyclical policy represents a serious challenge for a
small open economy operating within a monetary union, we do think having the
flexibility to engage in such a policy could be useful, especially in the presence of
asymmetric shocks which are known to be temporary in nature. Clearly such a policy
would not be well suited to dealing with permanent shocks. Allowing a role for some
stabilization, and given the move in the fiscal federalism case away from equity to
efficiency, might also mean the Scottish Executive would wish to generate alternative
sources of revenue.
One source would be borrowing. One of the anomalies of the current
devolution settlement is the fact that local authorities seem to have a greater degree of
fiscal autonomy than the Executive. They have a facility to borrow in times when they
face temporary falls in revenue.  One possibility for Scotland would be some kind of
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Scottish Loans Fund (which would essentially entail borrowing from central
government). Additionally, or alternatively, the Executive could also borrow from the
commercial banking system. Borrowing could also be envisaged for capital
investment through a Scottish Loan Fund, and from issuing securities for which there
are precedents in other countries, such as Canada.
While we are convinced that tax devolution would work in the direction of
improving efficiency in the fiscal system - so promoting allocative efficiency, a
degree of caution should be exercised.  It has to be recognised that how quickly the
benefits from addressing this vertical imbalance appear rather depends on how the
politicians in Edinburgh respond to their new budget constraint. If they quickly come
to recognise a strong inter-relationship between spending and taxing, allocative
efficiency may also quickly improve. However, this is not guaranteed because in
practice politicians may either not understand or strongly discount the effect of their
spending decisions on the level of taxes.  If so, the effect of the new budget constraint
on government spending will be slow in appearing.  In the former case - insightful
politicians - the efficiency-equity trade off is likely to be rapid, with some equity
being given up in exchange for greater efficiency in spending and taxing.  However, if
politicians take years, perhaps decades, to recognise the new budget constraint, some
equity will have been given up without much, if any, increase in efficiency. In a sense,
therefore, success in the efficiency-equity tradeoff in part depends on educating a
majority of the Scottish polity into understanding the spending-taxing implications of
a budget constraint of having to raise the bulk of tax revenues in Scotland. Tanzi
(2001) emphasizes the importance of having the relevant institutional framework in
place before the process of decentralisation actually takes place:
‘…the conclusion must be that, if decentralization is an important political
objective for a country and if that country can establish institutions that will make
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decentralization work with a reasonable degree of efficiency (institutions related to
tax administration, expenditure management systems, budgets, and so forth, but
especially institutions that allow the central government to transfer resources to
subnational governments with some assurance that these resources will be used
effectively for the purposes for which they are passed on, and without creating
expectations for the local governments that if they spend more, they will be bailed out
by the national government), then fiscal decentralization can be a good policy.’
The above position contrasts with that held by some World Bank experts who
argue that once decisions have been made to engage in greater fiscal decentralization,
the sub-national government will be stimulated to create the needed institutions and to
modify the existing incentives for policy makers to ensure the policy of
decentralization is a success.
Part IV Conclusions
       In this pamphlet we have considered the economic case for a fiscal federalism in
Scotland. Our discussion, and especially our proposal for fiscal federalism, is not
intended as definitive or the last word on this topic. Rather we hope to have raised the
key economic issues which are at the heart of any debate on an appropriate fiscal
federal system for Scotland, in the context of the current constitutional settlement in
the UK. In other words our focus in this pamphlet is intended to define the terms of
debate on this issue.
Our specific fiscal federal proposal involves the assignment and devolution of
tax revenues to Scotland. We mean by this that a considerable proportion of taxes
levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the Scottish budget. We have
argued for a balanced tax assignment, which is one that seeks to broadly match
identifiable expenditure in Scotland with assigned taxes. The key taxes included in the
assignment would be income tax, VAT and corporation tax, and income tax and a
package of other taxes would be devolved.
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       The Scottish budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by transfers
from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current situation
whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from Westminster. Our
suggestion falls short of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland – either in the sense of
independence with no shared obligations or in the sense of Scotland only making an
sovereign contribution for access to shared services without any equalization
mechanisms for areas such as social security – meaning that Scotland had control over
choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal transfers from Westminster would be
minimal.  We use propositions drawn from the theory of fiscal federalism to argue for
a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes retained in Scotland and public spending
in Scotland.  A closer matching of spending with taxes would better signal to
beneficiaries the true costs of public spending in terms of taxes raised.  It would also
create more complete incentives for politicians to provide public goods and services
in quantities and at qualities that voters are actually willing to pay for.  One important
feature of our recommendations is what we have labeled the marginal tax rule, by
which we mean that for any agreed fiscally devolved package, a decision by policy
makers to raise expenditure in one area has to be matched by an equi-proportionate
fall in expenditure elsewhere or by an equi-proportionate rise in taxes. Since from an
economic perspective decisions at the margin are crucial for allocative efficiency, we
regard this as an essential feature of a fiscal federalist solution for Scotland and
believe this would be achievable through our recommended devolved taxes.
Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal tax cost of spending does
not sufficiently figure in political calculations by the Executive and the Parliament as
spending is out of a fixed total budget.  Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered
in signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total
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budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster. In embarking on a fiscal
federalist system a needs assessment exercise would have to be conducted in order to
tie down the size of any bloc grant provided by the centre. We are also of the opinion
that any legislation creating tax assignment for Scotland should allow scope for
further modification of the Scottish fiscal system – much as on the lines of the
Spanish system where regional finances under the law are reviewed every five years.
At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in
sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen
horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions.  Horizontal balance
occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of public
goods and services at the same per capita tax cost.  The complete removal of the bloc
grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that currently
promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax revenues creates
other problems with full fiscal federalism.  Taxes derived from North Sea oil would
constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known to be volatile in
the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange rate.  At the present time
variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster. Scotland is insulated
through the bloc grant.  This risk sharing mechanism would be lost with full fiscal
federalism.  It is true that Scotland could turn to financial markets to tide itself over
oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and less diversified financial entity
than the UK as a whole it would probably have to borrow on less favorable terms than
can Westminster.  Scotland would have to bear this extra cost itself.
A further issue relating to the full fiscal federalism position is that it is difficult
to see how the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer.  At
present, tax revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are
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absorbed through an increase in vertical imbalance.  This acts as an automatic
stabilizer for the Scottish economy.  No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal
federalism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms
- as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls.
In sum, we argue that at the heart of the design of an appropriate fiscal system
at the central or sub-central level is finding an appropriate mix of the three key
economic roles of government, namely: the allocation, or, efficiency role; the equity,
or, income equality function; and the macroeconomic stabilisation role. Given the
current constitutional settlement in the UK it is our view that these three functions can
only be appropriately addressed in a fiscal system which falls short of the full fiscal
autonomy position.
Finally, any fiscal federalist proposal will clearly only work if the relevant
institutional framework is in place, and what is especially important is that the
Scottish polity respond positively to a new form of (hard) budget constraint, designed
to ensure time consistent behaviour. Clearly, it is impossible to predict ex ante how
the local polity will react to a changed fiscal environment. However, we do not regard
this uncertainty as a sufficient argument against addressing the important vertical
fiscal imbalance that currently exists within the UK. The latter implies for the Scottish
Parliament that it does not have sufficient power at its disposal to implant a core
element of its business effectively.
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS
Allocative efficiency: a combination of efficiency in production and efficiency in
consumption.  ‘Efficiency in production’ means that goods are produced at least
possible cost.  ‘Efficiency in consumption’ means that consumers are able to obtain
the goods that they want in the combinations they prefer.  Technically, allocative
efficiency is achieved when for any pairs of goods the ratio of marginal cost is equal
to the marginal rate of substitution (or ratio marginal utilities).
Assigned tax: taxes paid by and returned to the tax jurisdiction in which they were
raised. Our usage differs from that of some other writers who define an assigned tax
as being assigned to the jurisdiction of a SCG.
Balanced tax assignment: The tax revenue associated with the assigned taxes should
broadly match identifiable expenditure.
Barnett formula: “Put simply, the Barnett Formula sets percentages of changes in
comparable expenditure in Great Britain.  This is to say, it would be 85 for England,
10 percent of expenditure for Scotland and 5 percent of expenditure for Wales. This is
exactly what the Barnett Formula is”. (Edmonds, 2001, page 9). These shares are
based on population proportions in the Union as a whole. As public expenditure as a
share of GDP is greater in Scotland than in England, equal rates of public spending
growth over time is said to narrow per capita public spending between Scotland and
the English regions.
Benefit taxes: taxes that match benefits received by taxpayers. For example, residents
of a local school district paying the full cost of its school system.  Thus, residents ‘pay
for what they get’. See non-benefit taxes.
Bloc grant: an annual grant from Westminster to Edinburgh currently used to finance
devolved expenditures.
Central government: the government of the UK based in Westminster.
CG: see central government.
Conditional grant: a grant from central government to sub-central government that is
conditional on some action by the latter – very often to encourage sub-central
government to spend money for a designated purpose, such as education.  One
purpose of conditional grants is to take account of spillover benefits from one tax
jurisdiction to another.  This is known as ‘internalizing an externality’.  As the
spillover is a benefit not paid for by the receiving region, the sending region will tend
to under-invest in it.  The condition grant gets around this problem.
Devolved expenditure: expenditure classes devolved to Edinburgh under the Scotland
Act (1998) – such as spending on Scottish health and education.
Devolved tax: A tax, such as income tax, over which sub-central government has
some decision-making responsibility – such as setting the tax rate or the tax base
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Economies of scale occur when the average (or, per unit) cost of production falls with
the size, or, scale, of operations.
Equity or distributive justice occurs when the distribution of goods between people in
a society is thought to be ‘fair’ by the electorate.
Fiscal: of public spending and the taxes needed to finance such spending.
Fiscal equalization: see horizontal equity.
Fiscal federalism: in a strict legal sense fiscal federalism exists when a country’s
constitution grants rights to SCG over public spending and taxes.  These powers
cannot be removed by CG without an amendment of the constitution. Examples of
such federal systems include the USA, Canada and Germany.  In this sense the UK is
not a federalism system, rather it is a unitary state.  However, the term ‘fiscal
federalism’ is widely used in a looser sense to describe situations where SCG has
powers over spending and/or taxing that derives from CG that is not constitutionally
protected. In this sense, Scotland is already part of a ‘federal’ system but with rather
limited fiscal powers, especially over taxation.
Hard budget constraint: where the financial constraint on spending is binding –
a SCG has to live within its means without expecting relief from CG.
Horizontal balance occurs when per head public expenditure is similar between
regions at similar per head tax burdens. See also horizontal imbalance.
Horizontal equity what is judged to be ‘fair’ in taxing and spending between regions.
See also fiscal equalization.
Horizontal imbalance when per head regional tax burdens differ markedly for similar
levels of per head public spending. Horizontal imbalance is reduced if some tax
revenue raised in high income regions is transferred to a low income region. See also
horizontal balance.
Local public goods and services: their benefits are enjoyed within a restricted
geographic area, e.g. schools, hospitals, fire service.
Macroeconomic stabilization: see ‘stabilization function of government’.
Marginal tax rule: for any given fiscal settlement for Scotland, the ability to increase
expenditure in one particular area has to be paid for either by a reduction in spending
in another category or an increase in taxes.
Matching grant: see conditional grant.
Moral Hazard: Initially used in relation to the insurance industry.  An individual takes
out insurance and then acts differently once they are insured.  For example, somebody
with property insurance takes less care to secure their property.
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Needs equalization: money transferred from central government to sub-central
government on the basis of ‘need’ – usually to balance the per head supply of public
goods at similar local tax burdens.  Without needs equalization poorer regions would
have a greater tax burden for the same supply of public goods.
Non-benefit taxes: taxes not necessarily related to benefits received from public
spending in a region – such as taxes raised to redistribute income between high and
low income households. See also benefit taxes.
Public choice theory: a branch of economics that views government as being run by
self-interested agents.  Thus, politicians and bureaucrats in acting in their own best
interests do not necessarily act in the best interests of the electorate.
SCG: see sub-central government.
Soft budget constraint: when a SCG is aware that should it breach its spending or
borrowing limits it can expect relief from CG.
Source based tax: a tax levied where an income stream is generated or at the point
where spending on goods and services takes place.
Stabilization function of government: the use of the public finances to even out
fluctuations in national production an employment. For example, in a recession
increasing public spending and cutting taxes so as to stimulate the economy.
Sub-central government: a regional government, for example, the Scottish executive
and parliament based in Edinburgh. See also central government and CG.
Tax assignment problem: determination of the ideal balance between taxes raised
locally and total public expenditure in a region.
Time consistency: a commitment made today, because it is rational to make it today,
that is still rational to execute when the time comes to do so.  Thus, to constrain
possible SCG over-spending, CG commits to a ‘no bailout’ clause.  The commitment
is time consistent if SCG later threats default on its debts and it is still rational for CG
to let it happen. If at this time of a threatened default it is not rational to let the default
occur, the original commitment was not time consistent. Commitments that are known
not to be time consistent are likely to be ineffective in governing behavior.
Unconditional grant: a grant from CG to a SCG that is not conditional on a pre-
defined performance by the latter.  See also conditional grant.
Vertical balance in the tax structure is the relationship between taxes raised in a
region and a region’s public spending. High vertical imbalance means that taxes
raised in a region cover only a small part of local public spending.
Vertical imbalance; see vertical balance.
